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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has traditionally relied upon a limited mix of
mineral fuels, primarily consisting of coal, oil, and natural gas, to pro-
vide energy to power its industries, heat its homes and factories, and
fuel its means of transportation. For many years these sources of en-
ergy were abundant, relatively accessible at low cost, and, whether lo-
cated in the United States or abroad, effectively under the control of
domestic corporations. In 1970, the era of easily accessible mineral fu-
els passed, as increases in domestic reserves were outpaced by increased
domestic consumption.' In 1973, effective control over liquid fossil
1. See H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & G. MYERS, OIL AND GAS 85 (4th ed. 1979); ENERGY
FUTURE 3-4, 18 (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin eds. 1979).
[Vol. 16:357
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mineral fuel resources passed from the hands of domestic corporations
to a cartel made up of oil producing nations.2 Increasing societal con-
cern over the damage and the risk of damage posed by mineral fuel
mining and conversion into energy reduced the attractiveness of certain
mineral fuel resources, particularly coal, which the United States pos-
sessed in abundance. These resources, however, presented significant
environmental risks if used as alternatives to relatively "cleaner" min-
eral fuels, such as oil and natural gas.3
As the United States' reliance upon foreign sources of mineral fu-
els increased, renewed attention4 was directed to mineral resources
such as oil shale,5 tar sands,6 and coal-with emphasis upon coal
largely directed to its liquefaction or gasification.' These synthetic fuel
sources are found in relative abundance in the United States. Due to
environmental concerns,' geographic and geological accessibility,9 and
2. ENERGY FUTURE, supra note I, at 25-3 1. See also Mead, Political-Economic Problems of
Energy-A Synthesis, 18 NAT. RES. J. 703, 706-08 (1978).
3. NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES AND CHOICES: RE-
PORT OF THE NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP 187-96, 197-204, 208-10 (1977); ENERGY
FUTURE, supra note 1, at 91-94.
4. Alternative fuels, such as oil shale and coal gasification, are often publically perceived as
the fuels of the future whereas they are often the fuels of the past. Production of fuels from oil
shale preceded the production of fuels from petroleum. Shale oil was produced in France as early
as 1838, Scotland in 1850, Brazil and Australia before 1900 and Sweden and Germany before
1925. As early as 1920, the United States, through the Bureau of Mines, established a laboratory
in Colorado to conduct studies concerning the fundamentals of oil shale retorting and yields and
characteristics of shale oil products. In 1924 and 1944, Congress appropriated funds for the con-
struction and operation of demonstration and pilot plants to produce liquid fuels from oil shale.
Under both programs, retorts were constructed and operated. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, COMPENDIUM REPORTS ON OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGY, INTERAGENCY EN-
ERGY ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 1 (1.979) [hereinafter cited as
COMPENDIUM REPORTS].
Similarly, the technology for producing gas from coal has been available for some time but
whether the technology is cost competitive with liquid petroleum or natural gas is not clear. See
ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 1, at 68-69.
5. Oil shale is a fine-grained, laminated, sedimentary rock containing solid organic material
called kerogen which upon destructive distillation will produce a substantial amount of oil. See
COMPENDIUM REPORTS, supra note 4, at 9, 13; 1 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, AN As-
SESSMENT OF OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES 87 (1980) [hereinafter cited as OIL SHALE TECHNOLO-
GIES].
6. Tar sands are sandstones with pore spaces containing viscous-to-solid petroleum which
cannot be recovered by conventional methods.
7. ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 1, at 103-05.
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR ENERGY
TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS: SUMMARY REPORT (1979). The Report lists eight areas of concern: (I)
air quality (emissions from fossil technology processes include particulate matter, oxides of nitro-
gen and sulphur, hydrogen sulfide, hydrocarbons, ammonia, hydrogen cyanide, polycyclic aro-
matic hydrocarbons, nitrogen and sulphur--containing heterocyclic compounds, and trace
elements); (2) water quality (possibility of contamination of water through aquifer disruption, use
of chemicals, leeching of dissolved residuals, and effluent disposal); (3) solid waste (disposal of
3
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technological feasibility associated with the mining and transformation
of these resources into usable fuels, these resources had not previously
been thought economical to exploit.
It is not presently known whether it is economical to exploit syn-
thetic fuel resources, such as oil shale and tar sands.' 0 The problems
are numerous. First, as opposed to the more traditional fossil fuels, the
process by which synthetic fuel mineral resources are transformed into
usable fuels has not been actually demonstrated in commercial size fa-
cilities." Second, the economics of these synthetic fuel resources is
spent oil shale, mining waste, and production waste); (4) ecology (problem of interaction of vari-
ous processes disturbing the ecosystem, such as the effect upon ground temperature from in situ
synthetic fuel technologies which rely on underground burning); (5) health (possible carcinogenic,
mutagenic, teratogenic, and toxic effects resulting from products. processes, emissions and dis-
charges of a synthetic fuel facility); (6) safety (worker protection): (7) socio-economic factors
(competition for resources, boomtown problems); and (8) resource problems (land reclamation).
Id at 5-2 to 5-4. These concerns form the core of discussion in impact analyses of synthetic fuel
project siting. See COMPENDIUM REPORTS, supra note 4, at 155-98; OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES,
supra note 5, ch. 8; ENERGY FROM THE WEST, IMPACT ANALYSES REPORT: INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY FROM THE WEST I].
9. Mineral resources in sufficient quantities to justify the capital expenditures for synthetic
fuel projects lie primarily in the western United States and include the northern Great Plains and
Rocky Mountain states. Coal is found in all eight states of this region (Montana, North and South
Dakota, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona) with the largest concentrations
occurring in the northern Great Plains. The highest grade oil shale deposits occur in the Green
River Formation in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming. ENERGY FROM THE WEST I, supra note 8, at
2-14. Due to the sparseness of the current population in the development area, marketing of the
synthetic fuel produced requires long distance transport to the east or to the west coast of the
United States. Id at 149.
10. See note 8 supra. As opposed to conventional processes associated with the recovery of
oil and natural gas, the information base with respect to unconventional processes, such as oil
shale, is significantly incomplete. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT
PLAN: OIL SHALE 24-27 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN].
11. The Department of Energy is currently administering several true in situ and modified in
situ oil shale fuel extraction programs. Id at 13-15. Although coal gasification and liquefication
technology is in place, no commercial-size facility using the technology exists in the United States,
See Great Plains Gasification Assoc., 19 FED. POWER SERV. 5-540, rev'dsub nom. Office of Con-
sumers' Counsel v. FERC, 21 FED. POWER SERV. 6-197 (Fed. Energy Comm'n) (D.C. Cir. 1980).
In Great Plains, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had allowed certain tariffs
designed to guarantee recoupment of project cost because of the perceived need to demonstrate
the technological feasibility of the commercial-size project. The Commission found:
Although many of the individual components of the proposed plant utilize proven
technology, the record in the case indicates that there is significant uncertainty related to
the following:
(1) the various components of the plant will be put together in a particular se-
quence for the first time;
(2) the methanantion process of raising coal gas Btu from 350 to 900-plus Btu has
not been used in this precise way before;
(3) The sizes of some of the components are larger than have been used commer-
cially elsewhere; ...
Complications or difficulties resulting from any of these factors could result in cost over-
runs, delay in start-up, or reduced plant efficiency with attendant implications for the
long-run future of coal gasification.
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largely dependent on the continued and increasing high price of oil, a
factor which is subject to control by a foreign cartel.' 2 Consequently,
any analysis of the economic viability of synthetic fuel resources rests
upon a forecast of future oil prices, coupled with the cartel's willingness
to maintain high prices and thus protect competition.
For the above reasons, it has proven difficult, if not impossible, to
secure sufficient financing to construct synthetic fuel projects. The pri-
vate sector has proven itself unwilling to commit the necessary financial
resources to construct these projects, given the substantial risks outlined
above, dealing with the ability to build and profitably operate them. ' 3
To provide the necessary financial assurance to secure private sector
commitments to build and operate synthetic fuel projects, the federal
government has been called upon to assume the role of financier of last
resort. The justification for this call has generally been the perceived
Id at 5-563.
12. ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 1, at 26-31. This factor is, however, often overestimated.
Free-world oil production is about 60 million barrels per day. Even if synthetic fuel production
reached the ambitious level of 2 million barrels per day by 1992; the total impact would be less
than that realized by the discovery of the North Slope fields. It is questionable whether the cartel
would see synthetic fuel production as a serious threat to its pricing structure. Indeed, the high
cost of oil substitutes-synthetic fuels-would probably serve to firm the cartel price. Despairies,
Future Prices of OPEC and Non-OPEC Petroleum and of Rival Sources of Energy, J. OF ENERGY
AND EcON. DEV. 258, 260 (Spring 1980) (the future and eventual price of oil will tend toward the
price of the most expensive unconventional oil as soon as the latter becomes indispensible for
completing oil supplies).
13. Synthetic fuel projects outside the United States are heavily subsidized by government.
For example, the tar sands project in the Saskatchewan Province of Canada is subsidized through
price guarantees provided by the Canadian government. Similarly, the Sassol coal liquefaction
project in South Africa is subsidized. The Office of Technological Assessment, in an analysis of
the economics of various levels of oil shale development, concluded that some types of federal
assistance would be necessary. See OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at 17-19, 182-83. In
the United States, the only commercial-size synthetic fuel project to commence construction is the
Great Plains Coal Gasification Project, to be located in Mercer County, North Dakota. The plant
will use a coal gasification process commonly known as the lurgi process. The plant has been
designed to produce an average of 125,000 Mcf per day of pipeline quality gas from lignite coal
reserves held under option for that purpose. Essential to the obtaining of financial commitments
to construct and operate the plant was the granting by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion of approved tariff provisions at the outset that would: (1) provide for full recovery of debt
service (both principal and interest) in all circumstances; (2) permit collection of debt financing
costs during the construction period; (3) allow the outstanding debt to be amortized over a five
year period if abandonment should occur and in certain other events; (4) permit the project own-
ers to charge customer pipeline companies rates based on a full cost-of-service formula; (5) au-
thorize the customer pipeline companies to recover all such project costs on a current basis; and
(6) permit the customer pipeline companies to market the plants' output on a rolled-in basis. The
Commission granted in all major particulars the tariffs requested, thus providing for private fund-
ing of the project, but that decision was reversed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
See Great Plains Gasification Assocs., 19 FED. POWER SERV. 5-540, rev'd sub. nom. Office of
Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 21 FED. POWER SERV. 6-197 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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national security interest, which is associated with a strong domestic
synthetic fuels industry.' 4 The federal government has been increas-
ingly responsive, culminating in the passage of the Energy Security
Act."' This Act for the first time committed the federal government to
a major role as a financial backer of synthetic fuel projects.
This article examines the relationship between the financing provi-
sions of the Act and the costs imposed by permit and approval (regula-
tory) requirements of synthetic fuel project construction and operation.
The costs imposed by regulatory requirements on energy projects have
been well recounted.' 6 Synthetic fuel projects generally involve greater
capital expenses than traditional energy projects. When this capital ex-
pense is coupled with the uncertainty surrounding the technological
feasibility of synthetic fuel projects, the risk of noncompliance, and de-
lays caused by securing compliance can become significant. This arti-
cle assumes that if the risks, including the risks posed by agency action
or inaction, imposed upon the synthetic fuel project cannot be quanti-
fied, the project cannot be built. This assumption is based on the abso-
14. The origins of federal involvement in the synthetic fuel industry have a strong national
security underpinning. The first congressional appropriations in 1924 for oil shale study was pur-
suant to a presidental Naval Fuel Oil Committee appointed to study the problem of obtaining
adequate fuel oils for the Navy. See United States v. Winegar, 81 Interior Dec. 370, rev'd sub
nom. Shell Oil Co. v. Kleppe, 426 F. Supp. 899 (D. Colo. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Shell Oil Co. V.
Andrus, 591 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1979), afg'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4603 (1980). The "finding and purpose"
section of the Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 8701 (West Supp. 1980)), also places primary emphasis on national security as a reason for
embarking on a domestic synthetic fuel program. Id. § 10O(a)(l), (b)(1).
15. Act of June 30, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, § 135, 94 Stat. 611 (codf/ied at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 8701 (West Supp. 1980)) [hereinafter cited as Energy Security Act]. The various titles and subti-
tles of the Act have different popular names. For convenience, the generic title of Energy Security
Act is used throughout, although the Act may, with respect to materials discussed herein, be re-
ferred to as the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980.
16. See generally Hecox & Desautels, Federal Environmental Regulations Applicable to Explo-
ration, Mining and Milling." An Analysis and Some Suggestions for Coping with the Regulatory
Maze, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9-1 (1979). Attempts to quantify state and federal regula-
tions in the area of resource exploitation and development can be found in various sources. See S.
REP. No. 331, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-32 (1979) (congressional materials); U.S. ENVIROMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ENERGY FROM THE WEST-POLICY ANALYSIS REPORT 690-765 (1979)
(agency reports), E. DOLGIN & T. GUILBERT, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1974) (collection
of papers assessing the role of federal law in regulating use of the environment); Willrich, The
Energy-Environment Conflict: Siting Electric Power Facilities, 58 VA. L. REV. 257 (1972). The
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute is also a fertile field in which to find papers dealing with
the relationship between energy projects and regulatory compliance. See Friedman, The Opera-
tional Impact of NEPA and Related Environmental Laws, Regulations, and Orders on Mineral Oper-
ations, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 47 (1974); Haggard, Regulation ofMining Law Activitles on
FederalLands, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 349 (1975); Keppler, Mining and The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 501 (1975); Parcel,
Federal, State and Local Regulation ofMining Exploration, 22 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 405
(1976); Vivian, Archaeology, Mining and the Law, 22 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 787 (1976).
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lute cap on federal financial assistance to synthetic fuels projects 7 and
the unwillingness of the private sector to commit its resources to a pro-
ject in which it must maintain substantial risk capital.' 8 If the extent of
those risks cannot be determined before the financial commitment is
made, no such commitment will be made.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SYNTHETIC FUELS PROGRAM
A. The Energy Security Act
1. Organization of the Synthetic Fuels Program
The Energy Security Act creates, as its operating entity, the Syn-
thetic Fuels Corporation (SFC). 19 The SFC is a unique government
entity. It bears some similarities to a traditional government agency20
and some dissimilarities.2 ' It is in fact suigeneris and best understood
by examining its statutory function. The SFC is designed to serve as a
federally-funded investment banker.22 Congress authorized approxi-
mately $20 billion to be used during the first stage of the Energy Secur-
ity Act.23 After the submission of a report to Congress of first stage
activities by the SFC and the development of a "comprehensive strat-
egy" to exploit synthetic fuel resouces, the Energy Security Act pro-
vides that an additional $68 billion may be committed toward synthetic
fuel development by the SFC during the second stage of the Act.24
The SFC is organized around a seven member board of direc-
17. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 87310)() (West Supp. 1980).
18. See notes 52 and 125 infra and accompanying text.
19. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8716 (West Supp. 1980).
20. Thus, the SFC is subject to: the Sunshine-in-Government Act, id § 8712(0; and the
Freedom of Information Act, id § 8717, and is required to have an Inspector General, id § 8718.
21. Perhaps most meaningful of the dissimilarities is the exemption of the SFC from the
Administrative Procedure Act, id § 8775, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, id
§ 8775(b). Of some importance is that Congress did not extend the mantle of sovereign immunity
to actions by the SFC, id § 8768. On the other hand, the SFC, by being treated as an instrumen-
tality of the United States, is probably protected from state and local attempts to frustrate its
purposes. See Fischer, Allocating Decisionmaking in the Field of Energy Resource Development
Some Questions and Suggestions, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1054-56 (1980). Moreover, questions
relating to its financial commitments are probably governed by the federal common law. See
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
22. See Cass and Kilbreth, Synthetic Fuel Bill: Keystone of Energy Program, Legal Times of
Washington (July 21, 1980).
23. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8752 (West Supp. 1980). It is against
the $20 billion authorized that individual project funding limits are measured. See note 17 supra
and accompanying text, even though less than $20 billion has been actually appropriated by Con-
gress. See notes 47-50 infra and accompanying text.
24. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8722(b)(4), (c)(l 1) (West Supp. 1980).
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tors,25 appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for
seven-year staggered terms.2 6 The chairman, who must serve full time,
is the chief executive officer of the SFC.27
The SFC's authority includes the power to: employ no more than
300 full-time professionals; 28 establish offices outside the District of Co-
lumbia;29 adopt corporate characteristics, such as bylaws and a seal;30
own property and make contracts; 3' possess legal capacity; 32 and to ex-
ercise, under limited circumstances, the power of eminent domain. 33
The basic purpose of the SFC is to provide financial assistance for
synthetic fuels projects on the basis of solicitations published by the
SFC in the Federal Register.34 The funding mechanisms which the
SFC may employ include: loan guarantees; 35 price guarantees;36
purchase agreements; 37 direct loans; 38 and joint ventures. 39 The SFC is
also authorized to develop up to three government-owned, contractor-
constructed and operated (corporation construction projects) synthetic
fuel projects.40 The SFC is limited to a maximum commitment of $3
billion to any single synthetic fuel project.4 The SFC may, however,
combine various financing mechanisms, subject to certain conditions, 42
25. Id § 8712(a)(2).
26. Id § 8712(a)(2), (b)(V).
27. Id § 8712(a)(2), (b)(/).
28. Id § 8713(d).
29. -Id § 8711(b).
30. Id § 8771(a)(1).
31. Id § 8771(a)(3).
32. Id § 8771(a)(4).
33. Id § 8771(c).
34. Id § 8723.
35. Id § 8733.
36. Id § 8734.
37. Id § 8735.
38. Id § 8732.
39. Id § 8736.
40. Id §§ 8741-8742.
41. Id § 873 1O)(1). See note 23 supra. With respect to potentially open-ended commitments
such as price guarantees and purchase commitments, the cost of financial assistance is determined
by ascertaining the "probable" market price of the synthetic fuel product at the time of sale. 42
U.S.C.A. § 8734 (West Supp. 1980) (price guarantees); id § 8735(a) (purchase agreement), The
SFC's liability equals the difference between market price and price guarantee or purchase price
commitment. The SFC is required to limit its absolute liability with regard to committed financial
assistance by the inclusion of a clause in the financial package putting an absolute cap on the
liability committed to under the package. Id § 873 1(k)(V). The agreement must be accompanied
by a certification by the Secretary of the Treasury that sufficient unencumbered appropriations are
available in the Energy Security Reserve to satisfy the obligation of the agreement.
42. The Energy Security Act authorizes the SFC to provide financial assistance to qualifying
projects in a variety of forms. See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text. Although the SFC
has discretion to determine the form of financial assistance extended, that discretion is not unfet-
8
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as long as the $3 billion cap per project is not exceeded.
The role of the SFC is primarily that of financial backer. The de-
cision by the SFC to provide financial assistance is not treated as "ma-
jor federal action" for purposes of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA)4 3 nor is the internal operation and conduct of the SFC
subject to judicial challenge by private citizens.' Examination of the
SFC's activities by the judiciary will be extremely limited45 and largely
tered. For example, financial assistance in the form of direct loans or joint ventures cannot be
used unless the SFC determines that price guarantees, purchase agreements, or loan guarantees
will not suffice. See notes 71-80 infra and accompanying text.
43. See note 21 supra. It must be emphasized, however, that it is the "award" of financial
assistance which is statutorily exempted from treatment as "major federal action" which otherwise
triggers the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). Other federal involvement, as evidenced by the need to
secure a federal lease or permit, could trigger NEPA. Similarly, where the SFC is developing
corporation construction projects under § 141 of the Act, it is treated as a federal agency for
purposes of NEPA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8775(h) (West Supp. 1980). See CONFERENCE REPORT, S. REP.
No. 824, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT]. Moreover,
project applicants may find themselves subject to State Environmental Protection Acts which ex-
tend their jurisdictional umbrella to privately financed and operated projects. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 8743(b) (West Supp. 1980).
44. Id § 8767. The Act does not specifically forbid citizen suits; however, it only confers
standing to the Attorney General or Inspector General to challenge conduct of the SFC which is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Id § 8767(a). It was clearly the intent of the Confer-
ees that citizen suits were not to be allowed:
Section 167 authorizes the Attorney General of the United States or the Comptroller
General of the United States to sue the Corporation or any other person to prevent acts
of omission or commission in violation of the legislation. The section creates a public
cause of action, maintainable by the Attorney General or the Comptroller General, to
enforce the duties and responsibilities imposed by the legislation. The conferees do not
intend that mandamus actions would lie against the Attorney General or the Comptrol-
ler General to compel action under Section 167(a). The provision was patterned after a
similar statutory authorization providing for suits by the Attorney General to enforce
legal obligations of the Communications Satellite Corporation under the provisions of
[47 U.S.C. § 743 (1976)] and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
under the provisions of [45 U.S.C. § 547 (1976)].
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 231. This provision might receive any early construction
since suggestions have been raised that the SFC's initial solicitation was invalid. See SynFuels 1
(McGraw Hill, April 13, 1981).
45. The Energy Security Act limitations upon citizen suits extend only to challenges to the
internal operations of the SFC. Suits against the SFC for activity cognizable under the Federal
Torts Claims Act are allowed, Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8768 (West Supp.
1980), as are suits to enforce obligations entered into by the SFC. Id §§ 8767(c), 8771(4). The
scope of judicial review of SFC activities is, however, constrained by Congress' exemption to the
SFC from the need to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. See note 21 supra. The exemption is not, however, all-encom-
passing. Thus, the SFC may be required to demonstrate that its decisions are not arbitrary or
capricious and this demonstration may require the preparation of an administrative record, in-
dependent of the requirements of the APA. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 413 (1971). Although the APA is not directly applicable to the SFC, Congress has not
altogether prohibited judicial review. Section 167 of the Energy Security Act vests the federal
courts with jurisdiction to entertain cases involving the SFC. See Energy Security Act, supra note
9
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consistent with the "hands off" policy the federal courts have exhibited
when the question involves exercises of the spending power or war
powers.46
As noted previously, Congress authorized approximately $20 bil-
lion for synthetic fuel project financing by the SFC. Congress has,
however, only appropriated approximately $17 billion;47 of which
about one third is available to the Department of Energy during the
"fast start" program created by Congress to expedite synthetic fuel pro-
ject development while the SFC was being organized 8.4  Not only has
Congress kept controls on the program,49 but it seems unlikely that the
Reagan administration will support additional appropriations to the
SFC.5 0 Moreover, the SFC cannot recommit appropriated funds."
15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8767(a) (West Supp. 1980). In order to discharge its judicial function, the courts
will need some administrative record to determine whether SFC actions can be sustained.
46. See Fischer, supra note 21, at 1036-41.
47. The Interior Department's appropriations for fiscal 1980 established an Energy Security
Fund at the Department of Treasury in the amount of $19 billion. Supplemental Appropriations
and Recission Act, Pub. L. No. 96-126, 94 Stat. 881 (1980); see CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP.
No. 604, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1979). In an appropriation measure passed immediately after
the enactment of the Energy Security Act, Congress directed that the funds committed under Pub.
L. 96-126 were to be apportioned to provide $17.522 billion for the purposes of carrying out Title
I of the Energy Security Act. Supplemental Appropriations and Recission Act, Pub. L. No. 96-
304, 94 Stat. 881 (1980); see CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1149, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-
39 (1980).
48. The initial $19 billion appropriation under Pub. L. No. 96-126 was not specifically appor-
tioned to any agency, except for $2.208 billion which was specifically apportioned to DOE to
administer an interim synthetic fuel program under the Nonnuclear Research and Development
Act of 1974. See CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 604, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1980). The
reason for the lack of apportionment was that the SFC had not been created when the Interior
Department appropriation was considered by Congress. It was provided that any funds unappro-
priated out of the $2.208 billion would be transferred to the SFC.
Under Pub. L. No. 96-304, note 47 supra, Congress further specified that $3 billion of the
Energy Security Fund created by Pub. L. No. 96-126 would be apportioned to the "fast start"
program established under Title IA of the Energy Security Act. As with the $2.208 billion appor-
tioned to DOE by Pub. L. No. 96-126, all unexpended portions of the $3 billion apportioned to
Title IA programs would be transferred to the SFC by the earlier of June 30, 1981, or the date the
President declares the SFC to be fully operational. Id
49. Both the $2.208 billion apportioned to DOE to begin an interim program under the Non-
nuclear Act and the $3 billion apportioned to Title IA programs were credited against the $17.522
billion apportioned to Title I programs by Pub. L. No. 96-304. Thus, of the $17.522 billion appor-
tioned for Title 1 programs to be administered by the SFC, the DOE, which is administering the
interim Title IA programs pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12,242, 45 Fed. Reg. 65,175 (1980), has
authority to commit $5.208 billion, leaving approximately $12.2 billion for the SFC. And even
concerning the $12.2 billion clearly apportioned to the SFC, Congress provided that $6 billion
shall be immediately available and $6.212 billion shall be available for obligations only after June
30, 1982. See CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1149, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1980).
50. See NEWSWEEK, December 1, 1980, at 33 ("The new U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corp. will
probably be permitted to spend its first $20 billion appropriation, but private industry would have
to pick up the full cost of development projects after that."). The $20 billion figure seen in the
print media constituted the sum of Title I ($17.5 billion) and Title II ($1.3 billion) funding of the
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Where the SFC makes a financial commitment, that amount of the ex-
isting appropriation passes from the control of the SFC unless and until
Congress furnishes additional funds through an appropriation. Conse-
quently, while the Energy Security Act promises a substantial commit-
ment toward the development of a synthetic fuel industry, that promise
is likely to be only partially fulfilled at best. In effect, after the SFC
provides an initial helping hand to the private sector to explore the
commercial possibilities of a synthetic fuel industry, the determination
whether to proceed will be based upon private sector economics alone.
The Energy Security Act will, however, provide industry with some ex-
perience to test the technological feasibility of synthetic fuel projects. It
will also provide guidance whether regulatory risks, which contribute
to project costs, can be brought under control. This will provide a basis
to allow the private sector to assess the viability of developing synthetic
fuel resources without the presence of direct government aid.
2. Methods of Government Support for Synthetic Fuels
Programs
In order to qualify for federal financial assistance under the En-
ergy Security Act, the project owner or profit participants must main-
tain a substantial risk of after-tax loss in the event of any default or
other cancellation of a synthetic fuel project. 2 Consequently, the types
of financing available under the Energy Security Act affect the types of
risks assumed by the federal government and the project owner . 3
Moreover, since project completion delays and additional project
requirements occasioned by the regulatory process add to project costs,
the type of financing provided by the federal government and the risk
of additional costs imposed by the regultory process are interrelated.
Energy Security Act accomplished by Pub. L. Nos. 96-126 and 96-304, notes 47-48 supra, and a $1
billion appropriation for a "Solar and Conservation Reserve" created by Pub. L. No. 96-126, see
CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 604, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 27-28 (1979).
51. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8752, 8754 (West Supp. 1980).
52. Id § 8731(q), which provides:
[T]he Corporation shall impose such terms and conditions on any financial assistance
(after evaluating the financing of the synthetic fuel project, the tax benefits which would
be available to investors in the synthetic fuel project, and any regulatory actions associ-
ated with the synthetic fuel project) as may be necessary to assure that any investors
having an ownership or profit interest in the synthetic fuel project bear a substantial risk
of after tax loss in the event of any default or other cancellation of the synthetic fuel
project.
53. See notes 54-86 infra and accompanying text. See also OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra
note 5, at 193-216 (estimating the economic consequences of various financing alternatives).
1981]
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Adequate financing must include sufficient flexibility to account for
any unforeseen costs imposed upon the project by the regulatory pro-
cess, such as occasioned by regulatory delay in granting necessary per-
mits and/or approvals and new project requirements adopted by
regulatory agencies after the project's design specifications have been
completed and construction has commenced. 4
a. Purchase Agreements and Price Guarantees
Under the Energy Security Act, the SFC is authorized, backed by
the faith and credit of the United States, to agree to purchase a deter-
mined amount of product produced from the synthetic fuel project.5 -
The SFC may also guarantee that the project sponsors will receive a
54. See OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at 186.
A 50,000-bbl/d oil shale facility would require investment of around $1.5 billion in
1979. Operating costs are estimated by industry at $8 to $13/bbl of crude shale oil
processed, exclusive of capital recovery. Such an investment would be undertaken cau-
tiously even if the estimates of capital and operating costs for oil shale plants were
known to be accurate. However, during the past 10 years, capital cost estimates have
increased much more rapidly than has the general rate of inflation, and still do not ap-
pear to be totally reliable. The experience of Colony Development is illustrative but not
exceptional. Its direct capital cost estimates for a 43,000-bbl/d facility increased from
$225 million in 1972 to $1.3 billion in early 1979, and were $1.7 billion February 1980.
Cost escalations of this magnitude are not unusual for large, capital-intensive facili-
ties involving complex novel technologies. As demonstrated by experience with light
water reactors, many coal gasification plants. Canadian tar sands, and various weapons
systems, cost estimates are likely to rise rapidly as a process advances from initial to
definitive engineering designs. Also, as with similar projects, oil shale development is
highly vulnerable to changes in the cost of capital and labor. These costs have increased
more rapidly in recent years than the composite rate of inflation.
Cost overrides are currently an integral part of doing business. A study by Walter Meade cites 12
examples, including the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline, a rapid transit system, nuclear power plants,
bridges, dams, and even office buildings. W. Mead, G. Rogers & A Smith, TRANSPORTING NATU-
RAL GAS FROM THE ARCTIC: THE ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS 83-89 (1977). The projects studied had
an average of 121% cost growth after adjustment for inflation and changes in scope for the project.
The Rand Corporation prepared a study for the Department of Energy which shows that 10 en-
ergy process plants have experienced an average increase in cost of 141% from the first available
estimate to the actual cost of construction. RAND CORPORATION, A REVIEW OF COST ESTIMATION
IN NEw TECHNOLOGIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY PROCESS PLANTS, 95-108 (1979).
55. Energy Security Act, supra note 15,42 U.S.C.A. § 8735 (West Supp. 1980)). The rights of
the Corporation as a buyer under a purchase agreement are described in the Conference Report
and include price quality assurances, the right to refuse delivery, and the right to resell, transport,
refine, and/or store the synthetic fuel product. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 222-
23. The Conference Report further states:
The Conferees intend that the Corporation, to the maximum extent feasible, utilize
purchase agreements to obtain synthetic fuel from synthetic fuels projects in a form
which can be directly substituted for conventional supplies. The Conferees thus intend
that the authorities of subsection 135(e) to process and refine synthetic fuel obtained
pursuant to purchase agreements be exercised as a last resort. Use of such authorities to
directly or indirectly fund activities that would not otherwise qualify for financial assist-
ance would be inconsistent with congressional intent.
Id at 223.
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preset price for a determined amount of product it produces.56 The
SFC, in effect, guarantees to each project a market for its product when
the synthetic fuel plant is in operation. For purchase agreements, the
federal government, through the SFC, becomes the purchaser; for price
guarantees, the federal government agrees to make up any difference
between the market price at the time the synthetic fuel is produced and
the guaranteed price. The SFC must always determine at the time the
financing arrangement is entered into the market price at the time of
sale. This is the price the federal government will pay for a product
under a purchase agreement or will guarantee under a price guarantee.
The Energy Security Act generally forbids "cost plus" pricing formu-
las,57 although contractual adjustments, in the case of price guarantees
and purchase agreements, are permitted.58
Under a purchase agreement or price guarantee financing mecha-
nism, the risk of loss in the case of project default or cancellation is
effectively carried by the equity owners and lending institutions. This
is because no federal obligation arises unless and until the synthetic
fuel plant becomes operational and produces a "product" on which a
56. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8374 (West Supp. 1980). With respect
to the price guarantees the Conference Report states:
The Corporation is authorized to commit to, or enter into, price guarantees for all or
part of the production from a synthetic fuel project at a specific sales price. The Corpo-
ration may not enter into any "cost plus" arrangement or variation thereon in order to
guarantee a profit to the concern. However, if the Corporation subsequently determines
that the project would not otherwise be completed or continued and that the product is
necessary to achieve the purposes of the Title, it may renegotiate the sales price.
In awarding price guarantees, the Corporation shall establish such specified sales
price at the level which will provide the minimum subsidy determined by the Board of
Directors to be necessary to provide an adequate incentive, in light of projected prices of
competing fuels and the requirements for economic and financial viability of the syn-
thetic fuel project.
The Conferees intend that the Board of Directors when prescribing terms and con-
ditions for price guarantees, including establishment of the price set forth in the contract,
shall assure that an appropriate risk will be borne by the recipient, that an appropriate
level of price competition will be encouraged in the production and sale of synthetic fuel,
that the price support will phase out if marketplace forces make such support unneces-
sary, or such other conditions which the Corporation determines would achieve the pur-
poses of this section and this Title. In the event that prevailing market prices for
synthetic fuels are greater than a price guaranteed by the Corporation, the Corporation
should allow the marketplace to operate.
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 221.
57. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8734 (West Supp. 1980)) (no price
guarantee may be based upon a "cost plus" arrangement or variant thereof). But cf. id § 8735(a)
(sales price specified in purchase agreement shall not exceed estimated prevailing market price at
date of delivery unless SFC determines that higher price is necessary in order to insure the pro-
duction of synthetic fuel to achieve the purposes of Title I).
58. Id § 8742(s). Loans made or guaranteed by the SFC may also be revised if total project
costs exceed initial estimates. Id § 8732(a)(3) (direct loans). See also id § 873 l(b)(1)(b).
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purchase agreement or price guarantee can attach. Primary reliance
will therefore not be placed on purchase agreements and price guaran-
tees to finance synthetic fuel projects. 9 It is likely, however, that pro-
ject sponsors will try to induce the SFC to combine purchase
agreements with other forms of financial assistance available under the
Energy Security Act." Purchase agreements are advantageous because
they allow for the advancement of payments to the project sponsors
during construction of the project. Although the Energy Security Act is
silent on the question of advance payments, there was authority under
preceding legislation, the Nonnuclear Research Development Act of
1974.61 Should the SFC indicate a willingness to provide advance pay-
ments on purchase agreements, this may prove to be a desirable means
by which project sponsors can acquire, at the lowest possible cost,62
additional capital during the construction phase of the project.
b. Loan Guarantees for the Synthetic Fuel Industry
The financing method provided by the Energy Security Act being
given the most attention is the Act's authorization to the SFC to guar-
antee up to seventy-five percent of the initial total estimated cost of the
synthetic fuel project. 3 The uncertainties surrounding commercial
59. Forgotson and Anderson, Legal Times of Washington, Aug. 18, 1980, at 1; [1980] EN.
USERs REP. (BNA) No. 381 at 3.
60. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8731(o),(p) (West Supp. 1980).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5906(a)(4), 5907 (1976); S. REP. No. 589, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2162. See generally 41 C.F.R., §§ 9-30.000-.708 (1979).
62. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 9-30.403 (1979):
Interest will be charged on the unliquidated balance of all advance payments at the rate
established by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to Pub. L. [No.] 92-41, 85 Stat. 97,
for the Renegotiation Board; however, advance payments may be made without interest:
(1) Pursuant to FRR 1-30.403;
(2) In CPFF contracts for construction or engineering services; or
(3) Where the contract provides that title to the advance funds has been retained
by the government (§ 9-50.704-18).
Id
The activities of the Renegotiation Board were terminated effective March 31, 1979 under
Title V of Pub. L. No. 94-431, 92 Stat. 1043. What effect the termination will have upon the
setting of interest rates for advance payments is uncertain. One approach might be to analogize
advance payments to direct loans where the SFC is authorized to establish interest rates in light of
"the needs and capabilities of the recipient and the prevailing rates of interset (public and pri-
vate) .... Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8732(b) (West Supp. 1980)), The
interest rate cannot be less than "a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury. . .taking
into account the current average yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States
with remaining periods of maturity comparable to the average maturities of such loans." Id
63. Id § 8733. The SFC has indicated a preference for project financing which involves loan
guarantees rather than other forms of financial assistance made available by the Energy Security
Act. See SynFuels 2, (McGraw-Hill, January 30, 1981) (listing SFC project selection criteria).
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utilization of synthetic fuel technology had proven largely unaccept-
able to private sector lending institutions. The only major synthetic
fuel project to approach commercial production, the Great Plains Coal
Gasification Project, had secured financing conditioned on ultimate gas
consumer guarantees of the project cost. 64 These financing guarantees,
however, are only available where regulatory entities have jurisdiction
over rates and can provide project sponsors with sufficient revenues to
repay outstanding indebtedness.65 Outside of coal gasification, whose
end product comes under the authority over natural gas possessed by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Agency, the regulatory entities are too
fragmented to be able to effectively provide this type of assistance.66
And even if this assistance were available, consumer guarantees of
project financing through ratemaking will prove the exception, not the
rule.67
Any application6" for a loan guarantee must provide for a twenty-
five percent equity contribution to the initial total estimated cost of the
project.69 Moreover, the providing of a loan guarantee by the SFC is
The loan guarantee program set forth in the Energy Security Act is substantially similar in general
configuration to an amendment to the Nonnuclear Research and Development Act of 1974 which
was contained in the Department of Energy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-238, § 19, 92 Stat. 47.
The amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 5919 (Supp. 11 1978), was designed to provide loan guarantees for
alternative fuel demonstration facilities.
64. [1980] EN. UsERs REP. (BNA) No. 381 at 10. The status of this financial commitment is,
however, uncertain. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently disapproved
several essential tariffs, which had been authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion in Great Plains Gasification Associates, 19 FED. POWER SERv. 5-540 (1979), rev'd sub nom.
Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 21 FED. POWER SERV. 6-197 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The pro-
ject sponsors are reported to be unsure whether the project will be continued. See [1981] EN.
USERS REP. (BNA) No. 388 at 71.
65. In Office ofConsumers' Counsel the court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission exceeded its jurisdiction when it attempted "to create a rate-payer-based financing pack-
age for the construction of [the Great Plains Coal Gasification Project] despite the fact that its
rate-setting and certificate powers were not granted to it for that purpose." 21 FED. POWER SERV.
at 6-219. If the decision stands, it would effectively remove federal agencies, with nationwide rate-
setting powers, from any meaningful role in encouraging private sector financing through
ratemaking financial guarantees.
66. In Office ofConsumers' Counsel, the court also stated that the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission would not acquire ratemaking authority until the time of actual commingling of the
synthetic gas in the pipeline system. Id at 31. Project financing requires some assurance that
rates will be sufficient to repay the capital costs of the project whether it is successful or not. The
inability of the ratemaking agency to provide some form of preconstruction assurances would
likely prelude reliance on ratemaking as a means of providing financial incentives for synthetic
fuel projects.
67. See Great Plains Gasification Associates, 19 FED. POWER SERv. at 5-623.
68. An applicant for financial assistance must be a "qualified concern" as that term is defined
by the Act. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8702(15) (West Supp. 1980).
69. Id 8732(a)(2) (limiting loan guarantees issued by the corporation to 75% of the initial
estimated cost of the project). The equity contribution need not, however, be a cash or cash
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dependent upon the "credit elsewhere" test.7" The SFC may not ex-
tend financing assistance in the form of loan guarantees unless it deter-
mines that adequate financing is not otherwise available to the
project.71 The conference report indicates that this requirement is
designed to avoid competition between the SFC and private capital
markets.72 The SFC is not required to do an exhaustive analysis of
financial markets or the economy to determine if adequate financing is
available. Rather, the SFC "should take into consideration whether it
would constitute a prudent business judgment for the applicant to
make available additional capital."73
The major, if not overriding, advantage of loan guarantees for pro-
ject sponsors is that they place the full faith and credit of the United
States behind the project from the very beginning. Unlike purchase
agreements and price guarantees, which require a product before the
financing mechanism becomes effective, loan guarantees support, on a
percentage basis up to seventy-five percent of initial project cost, each
dollar committed to the project by lending institutions up to the
amount of the guarantee.74 Loan guarantees possess an added benefit
over other forms of financial assistance, such as purchase agreements or
price guarantees. Whereas the latter allow the SFC to take a profit
participation role as a condition for extending financial assistance, the
extension of loan guarantees does not authorize profit participation by
the SFC.7 5 In effect, should a default occur which would require the
application of the guarantee, the SFC is limited to the assets of the
entity whose indebtedness it guaranteed and the equity contribution of
the project sponsors. 76
c. Other Methods of Government Supportfor Synthetic
Fuel Projects
The Energy Security Act establishes a priority for available
equivalent contribution. Id § 873 1(m). A similar provision was added in 1978 by amendment of
the Nonnuclear Research and Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5919 (Supp. 11 1978).
70. Energy Security Act, supra note' 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8731(r) (West Supp. 1980).
71. Id
72. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 217.
73. Id
74. The total dollar commitment of SFC financial assistance for a project must be specified.
See Energy Security Act, supra note 15,42 U.S.C.A. § 8731(k)(1) (West Supp. 1980). See note 41
supra.
75. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, U.S.C.A. § 8731(n) (West Supp. 1980).
76. Id § 8737.
[Vol. 16:357
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financial assistance.77 As a general principle, the SFC is directed to
select the financing mechanism which is "most advantageous in meet-
ing the national synthetic fuel production goar 78 with the "least com-
mitment of financial assistance by the [SFC] and the lowest unit
production cost within a given technology."7 9 In decreasing order of
priority, the SFC may consider: (1) price guarantees, purchase agree-
ments and loan guarantees to private sector lenders; (2) direct loans by
the SFC to the project; and (3) joint ventures." First priority goes to
price guarantees, purchase agreements and private sector loan guaran-
tees, with no preference expressed by Congress about these forms of
financial assistance inter se. The other lesser orders of priority for
financial assistance-direct loans and joint venture projects-require
that the SFC determine that "neither price guarantees, purchase agree-
ments, nor loan guarantees will adequately support the construction
and operation of the synthetic fuel project."81
The requirement that second and third levels of financial assist-
ance cannot be invoked unless the primary level of financial assistance
proves inadequate, means that only the riskiest projects will be consid-
ered for direct loans or joint ventures. Moreover, since the financial
assistance solicitation under the "fast start" program 82 oversubscribed
the amount of funding available under the first stage of the Energy
Security Act,83 there would be little financial assistance available for
projects not qualifying for primary level assistance.84 Even if financial
77. Id § 8731(b)(2)(B). The SFC is also authorized to undertake up to three Corporation
construction projects. Id § 8742. These corporation construction projects may only be under-
taken prior to the approval by Congress of a "comprehensive strategy," pursuant to § 126(c) of the
Act, (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8722(c) (West Supp. 1980)), and subject to the SFC's determination
that the "Corporation construction project" is necessary to meet the objectives of section
8722(a)(2) and would not otherwise be constructed with financial assistance awarded under subti-
tle D of the Act. Id § 8741(a).
78. Id § 8731(b)(2).
79. Id § 8731(b(2)(A).
80. Id § 8731(b)(2)(B).
81. Id § 8731(p).
82. See notes 88-113 infra and accompanying text.
83. [1980] EN. USERs REP. (BNA) No. 380 at 12.
84. Eighteen companies sought financial assistance under either or both of the interim "fast
start" programs. Id. A 1.5 billion loan guarantee was extended to Great Plains Gasification Asso-
ciates by DOE. See [1981] EN. UsERs REP. (BNA) No. 381 at 10. The doubt thrown on the $1.5
billion guarantee by the Office of Consumers' Counsel decision, see text and notes 64-67, supra,
and the general uncertainty over the Reagan Administration's approach to the synfuel program,
put the "fast start" program into neutral. Recently, the Administration has indicated a willingness
to back the "fast start" program which may put the program back on track. See SynFuels I
(McGraw Hill, Feb. 23, 1981).
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assistance is available for direct loans or joint ventures, the provisions
may not prove to be attractive. The SFC's authority to commit direct
loans to a project is subject to the same limitations on financial expo-
sure as are required for loan guarantees. Concerning joint ventures,
the SFC is prohibited from financing "more than [60] percentum of the
total costs of the synthetic fuel project module, as estimated by the SFC
as of the date of execution of the joint venture agreement."86 It can be
expected that proposed projects, which cannot be financed with a com-
bination of purchase agreements, price guarantees, and seventy-five
percent of initial project cost loan guarantees, backed by the full faith
and credit of the United States, will be anything but bridesmaids at the
altar. If these non-primary means of financing achieve any usefulness,
it will most likely be on an extremely limited basis to examine promis-
ing technologies which have not, as yet, been tested in demonstration
level modules.
B. The "Fast Start" Program
Congress realized that it would take some time for the SFC to or-
ganize itself into a functioning entity. 7 In order to expedite the begin-
nings of a domestic synthetic fuel industry, Congress authorized a "fast
start" program.88 Under the "fast start" program, the Department of
Energy (DOE) was authorized to commit approximately $5.2 billion in
the interim period before the President declared the SFC "fully opera-
tional." 9 The $5.2 billion is part of the total $17.2 billion appropriated
by Congress to fund the first stage of the synthetic fuel program envi-
sioned under the Energy Security Act.9" Funds not committed by DOE
at the time the President declares the SFC "fully operational" are auto-
85. Compare section 132(a)(2)(A) of the Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 8732(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1980), with § 133(a)(2) of the Act, (codifed at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 8733(a)(2) (West Supp. 1980). Both provisions limit SFC financial assistance to 75% of initial
estimated project cost.
86. Id. § 8736(a).
87. CONFERENCE REPoRT, supra note 43, at 192.
88. There were in reality two "fast start" programs. The first "fast start" program was specif-
ically provided for in Title I(A) of the Energy Security Act. Defense Production Act Amend-
ments of 1980, §§ 101-108, enacting 50 U.S.C. §§ 2075, 2076 & 2095-2098, (amending 50 U.S.C.
App. §§ 2061, 2062, 2066, 2071, 2075-76, 2091-93, 2096-98 (1976)). The second "fast start" pro-
gram was established under the Nonnuclear Research and Development Act of 1974, as amended
for the development of alternative fuels, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5919 (West Supp. 1978).
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matically removed from DOE jurisdiction and are transferred to the
SFC.91
1. Synthetic Fuel "Fast Start" Programs under The Nonnuclear
Research and Development Act of 1974
The Nonnuclear Research and Development Act of 1974 (Non-
nuclear Act) contains authority for the Energy Research Development
Agency to provide assistance in the development and demonstration of
alternative energy sources, including synthetic fuels.92 Attempts by ei-
ther the Congress or the Administration to provide funding for syn-
thetic fuel projects proved unavailing.93 It was not until 1978 that any
significant funding was made available for synthetic fuel demonstra-
tion plants and research and development.94
In 1979, concern over the availability of liquid fuels spurred re-
newed interest in a synthetic fuel program. This concern culminated in
the enactment of the Energy Security Act. To begin the synthetic fuel
program as soon as possible, Congress provided in the Interior Depart-
ment Appropriation for fiscal 1981 an allocation of $2.2 billion for syn-
thetic fuel programs under the Nonnuclear Act.95 This program is to
be administered by DOE96 until the President declared the SFC "fully
operational."'97 Any funds then remaining which had not been com-
mitted to financial assistance for synthetic fuel projects would be trans-
ferred to the SFC.98 The authority of DOE to provide financial
assistance under this interim program is limited to purchase agree-
ments, price guarantees, and loan guarantees.99 Solicitations for assist-
91. Id
92. See note 60 supra. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 5919 (West Supp. 1980).
93. The recent history of congressional efforts to provide financial assistance for synthetic
fuel development is described in [1973] CQ ALMANAC at 645-49; [1974] CQ ALMANAC at 54-58;
[1975] CQ ALMANAC at 268-69, 281-90; [1976] CQ ALMANAC at 153-160, 174-77; [1977] CQ AL-
MANAC at 683-92.
94. In 1978, Congress appropriated $90 million for the construction of two synthetic fuel
demonstration plants, [1978] CQ ALMANAC at 122, and enacted a 10% tax credit for the purchase
of equipment used in the production of synthetic fuel. Energy Tax Act of 1978, § 301(b), as
amended by 26 U.S.C.A. § 48(1) (West Supp. 1980). For the first time Congress appropriated
significant moneys for synthetic fuel development. Department of Energy Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-238 § 101, 92 Stat. 47-48 (1978).
95. See notes 47-49 supra.
96. Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. 970; CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 604, 96h Cong.,
1st Sess. 24 (1979).
97. CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. RaP. No. 1149, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 37 (1980).
98. Id
99. Id at 36.
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ance under the interim program were published in the Federal Register
and closed on November 14, 1980.100
Although the interim program is designed to provide a smooth
transition to a "fully operational" SFC, there are some pitfalls along
the way. First, where the Energy Security Act is designed to demon-
strate the feasibility of commercial size synthetic fuel plants, the Non-
nuclear Act is designed to demonstrate technological feasibility
through modular size plants.' 0' Consequently, the interim program
must serve two masters. It must look to its successor entity, the SFC,
and securely mesh its operations with the goals to which the SFC is
directed and the procedures the SFC will adopt to meet those goals.
The legal authority of the interim program, however, is not tied to the
Energy Security Act but to the Nonnuclear Act which was essentially
research and development oriented and not designed to function in a
lending or investment capacity. 2 Whether the uncertainty will prove
to be sufficient to frustrate the program is unclear. 0 3
2. Synthetic Fuel "Fast Start" Programs Under the Defense
Production Act
The same reasons that led Congress to appropriate $2.2 billion for
an interim program under the Nonnuclear Act also induced Congress
to authorize $3 billion for an interim program for synthetic fuel project
financial assistance under the Defense Production Act of 1950. 04
Unlike the interim program under the Nonnuclear Act, the interim
program created under the auspices of the Defense Production Act is
100. U.S. Department of Energy, Solicitation Announcement No. DE-PS60-81RA 50480. See
[1980) EN. USERS REP. (BNA) No. 376 at 12.
101. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5919 (West Supp. 1980).
102. Indeed, it took specific amendment of the Nonnuclear Act in 1978 to enable financial
assistance to be provided for even demonstration-size projects. See note 62, supra. See also 1978
CQ ALMANAC 115-122, 154-161, 688, 747-48.
103. The legislation setting up the interim "fast start" program under the Nonnuclear Act
provided for specific overrides where the Nonnuclear Act was inconsistent with the interim "fast
start" program. Pub. L. No. 6-126, 93 Stat. 970 (1979); CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No, 604,
96th Cong., Ist Sess., 25 (1979) (providing that loan guarantees for oil shale facilities issued under
this appropriation may be used to finance construction of full-sized commercial facilities without
regard to section 19(b)(1) of the Nonnuclear Act requiring prior demonstration of a modular
facility). The DOE attempted to reconcile the different approaches in the regulations promulgated
to implement the loan guarantees and other financial assistance as authorized by section 207 of
Title II of the Department of Energy Act of 1978. 10 C.F.R., Part 796, 45 Fed. Reg. 15,468 (to be
codified in 10 C.F.R. § 796.1-.99) (1980).
104. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, §§ 101-108, 94 Stat.
612 (1980). See note 88, supra.
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securely tied to the Energy Security Act. Title I(A) of the Energy Se-
curity Act specifically provides for the interim program under the De-
fense Production Act until the SFC is declared "fully operational" by
the President."0 5 When the SFC is declared "fully operational," un-
committed funds will be transferred to the SFC, °6 and the authority
under Title I(A) will become standby authority which may be activated
by the President in the event of a serious energy shortage.0 7 Financial
commitments under this interim program are limited to purchase
agreements, loans, and loan guarantees.' By presidential directive,
DOE was given administrative authority over this interim program.109
Solicitations for assistance under this interim program were published
in the Federal Register and closed on November 14, 1980.110
A more studious attempt was made by Congress to mesh this in-
terim program with the general program to be developed by the SFC.
The difference is possibly explainable because unlike the interim pro-
gram under the Nonnuclear Act,' there was no existing administra-
tive or statutory apparatus on which the Defense Production Act
interim program could be fashioned. Congressional desire to begin im-
mediate work on a synthetic fuel program caused it to begin looking for
suitable vehicles on which to attach the interim programs. Defense re-
quirements have proven to be particularly significant when justification
for a synthetic fuel program is sought;I"2 hence, the Defense Production
Act was chosen as the natural vehicle for the interim program.
105. Id § 104; see Pub. L. No. 96-304, 94 Stat. 880 (1980).
106. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, § 105(a)(4)(C), 94
Stat. 612 (1980).
107. Id § 104(e).
108. Id
109. Exec. Order No. 12,242, 45 Fed. Reg. 65,175 (1980).
110. U.S. Department of Energy, Solicitation Announcement No. DE-PS60-81RA-50481. See
[1980] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) No. 376 at 12.
111. On June 28, 1979, the DOE issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to establish regula-
tions for the implementation of loan guarantees and other assistance for the Alternative Fuel
Demonstration Facilities Program authorized by section 207 of Title II of the Department of
Energy Act of 1978. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,790 (1979). These proposed rules are predicated upon the
enactment of Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. 970 (1979), which provided appropriations for DOE to
guarantee or commit to guarantee indebtedness for the construction of alternative fuel demonstra-
tion facilities. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text and notes 92-103 supra. On March
10, 1980, the DOE published final rules which attempted to mesh the basis framework described
in the proposed rulemaking of June 28, 1979, with certain required procedures and provisions
contained in Pub. L. No. 96-126. 45 Fed. Reg. 15,468, 15,469 (1980).
112. See [1979] CQ ALMANAC at 632-33.
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3. The Role of "Fast Start" Programs
The experience of DOE personnel and project sponsors under the
"fast start" program will be influential in determining the eventual path
of the SFC's synthetic fuel program. These "fast start" programs will
provide guidance to the views of DOE and SFC personnel" 3 on the
manner in which the programs ought to be administered. The solicita-
tion for proposals published in the FederalRegister by DOE to institute
the "fast start" programs should prove to be particularly insightful, as
the solicitations present DOE and SFC views on the relationship be-
tween permit and approval compliance and project financial assistance.
This point is discussed in Part 4 of this article.
III. PROJECT FINANCING AND PROJECT PERMITS AND APPROVALS
A. Regulatory Risk
Regulation imposes costs on those who are regulated."t 4 In the
context of energy project construction and operation, these costs are
most directly imposed by regulations which require that the party sub-
ject to them does some specific act as a condition precedent to securing
necessary regulatory permission to proceed. To the extent that regula-
tory requirements can be identified, the cost of compliance can be cal-
culated to some reasonable degree of certainty. Thereafter, the
economic viability of the project can be determined based on the esti-
mated cost of the project, and whether adequate financing is available
to cover initial estimated cost. It is on "initial total estimated cost" that
113. Contrary to earlier indications, a sizable migration of DOE personnel to the SFC oc-
curred after the defeat of President Carter in November, 1981. See [1980] EN. UsERs REP. (BNA)
No. 380 at 11.
114. OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGICS, supra note 5, at 344-45:
The high cost of oil shale projects makes unexpected delay costly, with uncertain agency
decision schedules or with unpredictable litigation that can delay or prevent project con-
struction. Furthermore, some regulations and standards have not yet been set because of
a lack of sufficient knowledge about the impacts of shale operations and the effectiveness
of their control. Developers are particularly worried about the effects of new regulations
(such as for visibility maintenance as part of the PSD process) on process design and
project economics. They are concerned that new regulations could necessitate costly re-
trofits to existing plants or even the cessation of operations. For facilities under con-
struction, the new regulatory requirements may mean redesign or addition of
environmental control equipment or strategies. These uncertainties increase the risk that
a project, once started, may not be completed. Prospective developers also express their
frustration over the lengthy and expensive procedures for preparing permit applications
(including monitoring and modeling requirements) to meet some environmental statutes.
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the SFC's percentage contribution of loan guarantees'" 5 and probably
the project owner's "substantial risk"' 6 will be computed. Regulatory
risk, however, envisions that the certainty of this process can never be
guaranteed. The first problem is delay which invariably results in in-
creased project costs, 1 7 which may ultimately be the death knell of the
project."' Project delay can be caused in a variety of ways: (1) the
115. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8733(a)(2) (West Supp. 1980).
116. Id § 8731(q), which provides:
[The] Corporation shall impose such terms and conditions on any financial assistance
(after evaluating the financing of the synthetic fuel project, the tax benefits which would
be available to investors in the synthetic fuel project, and any regulatory actions associ-
ated with the synthetic fuel project) as may be necessary to assure that any investors
having an ownership or profit interest in the synthetic fuel project bear a substantial risk
of after tax loss in the event of any default or other cancellation of the synthetic fuel
project.
Id The term "substantial risk" received no definition in the Energy Security Act or the legislative
history of the Act. The interpretation of the term "substantial risk" is, however, influenced by
limitations upon specific forms of financial assistance, such as loan guarantees (75% of initial
estimated project cost), price guarantees and purchase agreements (which require a functioning
facility generating a product on which the guarantee or agreement can attach). Interpretation of
the term "substantial risk" is also influenced because a cash or cash equivalent contribution is not
required in order for "substantial risk" to exist. Id § 8731(m). When several forms of project
financing are made available, the SFC need only "insure that the recipient of such financial assist-
ance shall bear a reasonable degree of risk in the construction and operation of such project." Id
§ 8731(o). The reason for a lessened requirement of investment risk where two or more forms of
financial assistance are made available is that the SFC is precluded from awarding more than a
single form of financial assistance unless it determines that "multiple forms of financial assistance
are required for the viability of the project, and further, that the project is necessary to achieve the
purposes of this title and the provisions of this part." Id Where a single form of financial assist-
ance is insufficiently attractive to secure necessary investment funds and/or private sector financ-
ing to construct a project deemed by the SFC to be critical to the success of the Energy Security
Act, the SFC can moderate the necessary equity contributions, so that they are commensurate
with the risk involved. The greater the need to reduce risk to attract some private sector invest-
ment, the closer the SFC comes to providing cost of construction financing.
117. See [1979] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) No. 309 at 14 (John McMillan, chairman and chief
executive officer of the Northwest Alaskan Pipeline Company, notes that for a $12 billion project,
such as the Alaskan Gas Pipeline, each year of delay will cost $1.2 billion.)
118. REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL-THE REVIEW PROCESS FOR PRIORITY EN-
ERGY PROJECTS SHOULD BE EXPEDITED 5-8 (1979) (reviewing the problem of regulatory delay
encountered in connection with the Sohio project). See note 54 supra.
Project delay may also result in the loss of an energy project if the ratio between project
financing and project cost is so tight that there is no provision for project delay:
To understand the prospects for successful commercialization, it should be recognized
that many of the technical, economic, and institutional impediments are interdependent
in general, the potential for successful commercialization is limited by the margins avail-
able to accommodate a technology to these impediments without encountering barriers.
Thus, if the relative economic advantage of a process is very large, then extensive adjust-
ments to environmental standards can be made without reaching an economic barrier.
When a process has relatively low technical performance requirements, it may be possi-
ble to reduce economic or institutional barriers by upgrading technical performance.
However, if technical performance goals are high, production costs are close to or exceed
the selling price for competitive products, and institutional barriers are restrictive, then
the technology will encounter serious difficulties. Under these conditions, the usual re-
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sheer size and complexity of the regulatory process;" 9 (2) problems of
the administration of new, untested regulations; 12  and (3) conflicts
among regulatory agencies. 12 1 A second problem relates to the sub-
stantive requirements that the regulatory agency seeks to impose upon
the regulated party. The synthetic fuel projects envisioned under title I
of the Energy Security Act are multi-billion dollar projects, requiring
significant lead times. Projects proposed in 1980 are not, even if every-
thing goes right, planned to be in commercial operation until 1985 or
later.122 Consequently, the capital costs of a project based on compli-
ance with current environmental technology may be seriously distorted
if the project is required to comply retroactively with new environmen-
tal standards.123 Similarly, since even current synthetic fuel technology
is, for the most part, untested and untried, 124 project sponsors face un-
sponse ofindustry would be to postpone commercial commitment while waiting for tech-
nical improvements, reduced institutional barriers, or improved market prices for the
product.
OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at 184-85.
119. For example, the Northwest Federal Regional Council conducted a Permit Issuance
Study for a hypothetical Northern Tier Interstate Crude Oil Pipeline System. The study found
that such a project would require 13 separate federal permit/approval requirements, and II sepa-
rate state permit/approval requirements distributed among the five states in which the pipeline
would be located. The permit/approval process is also lengthy:
[Aldministrative agency proceedings [average] more than 19 months for licensing, 21
months for ratemaking, and over [3] years for enforcement actions. In licensing and rate
making proceedings, it takes an average of 160 days for matters even to reach the hearing
stage; for enforcement actions, it averages well over a year before a hearing is even con-
vened.
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S. Doc. No.
72, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at ix. See also OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at 343-51 (dis-
cussing various permit and approval requirements for an oil shale project).
120. See REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL-THE REvIEW PROCESS FOR PRIORITY
ENERGY PROJECTS SHOULD BE EXPEDITED 38-39 (1979).
121. See Inside DOE, October 17, 1980, at 1, discussing conflict between the DOE and the
Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] over whether the pre-manufacture review requirements
of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 and Supp. I1 1979), apply at
the demonstration or commercial plant stage of synthetic fuel projects. The DOE takes the posi-
tion that the review requirements only apply at the commercial stage; the EPA asserts that the
review requirements may apply at the demonstration stage. The issue is further discussed in notes
265-67 infra and accompanying text. See also Inside DOE, October 24, 1980, at 1, discussing
DOE's attempt to force the EPA into consolidating regulatory programs.
122. See [1980] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) No. 380 at 12.
123. The courts have been noticeably unsympathetic to "vested" right claims. See e.g., Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. Feldstein, 105 Cal. App. 3d 590, 164 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1980) (no vested rights to
operate facility without restriction after permit is issued); cf. EPA v. National Crushed Stone
Ass'n, 49 U.S.L.W. 4008 (EPA not required to consider economic capability in granting variances
from its uniform "best practicable control technology currently available" regulations). More-
over, the permit/approval acquired may be open-ended and specifically contemplate additionally
burdensome requirements. See e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
124. As noted previously, several forms of synthetic fuel technologies have long histories. See
note 4 supra. The technologies currently being considered, however, are significantly advanced
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certainties relating to whether the environmental technology will be
feasible in commercial size plants,125 and how the new, untested, and
untried standards will be administered by regulatory agencies. Even if
the standards themselves are clear, problems may arise as a result of
differing views held by project sponsors and regulatory agencies about
how performance under the standards is to be determined and mea-
sured.
The consequence of these uncertainties regarding the regulatory
process and regulatory standards is that "initial project cost" becomes a
highly fluid determination. Moreover, since project financing is depen-
dent upon "initial project cost," the assurance that initial financing will
be adequate is only as secure as the "initial project cost" estimate. Reg-
ulatory risks thus influence and even control the determination whether
from previous levels; the changes needed to improve production efficiencies, reduce costs, and
limit consequential environmental degradation. See note 11 supra. And while the feasibility of
these new technologies is uncertain, this uncertainty does not necessarily preclude regulatory stan-
dard-setting. See, e.g., Currie, Direct Federal Regulation of Stationary Sources under the Clean Air
Act, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1389, 1409-17 (1980) (discussing the "adequately demonstrated" require-
ment of section 111 of the Clean Air Act). Currie notes:
If we apply what we know of the legal standard [adequately demonstrated] to the sulfur-
oxide situation as it stood in 1969, we find the record quite weak. FGD [Flue Gas
DeSulphurization] technology had been put to substantial actual use in Britain, but the
British data revealed troublesome bugs that deserved further study. Moreover, the Brit-
ish technology was obsolete, while the only reported test of new technology had been run
on a tiny fraction of the boiler's exhaust gas. In terms of immediate application the new
technology was barely beyond the "experimental" stage that the House Report said was
insufficient. The prudent Administrator would probably have concluded that an instal-
lation requirement should await the results of the three promising purchases of new tech-
nology, and should probably have held that the technology was not yet "adequately
demonstrated."
The 1971 record presented a closer question. Two full-scale units were now in more
or less successful operation, and the EPA was optimistic that an alternative technology
might be successfully transferred from oil to coal. Yet hindsight provides a sobering
note: the full-scale prototypes soon proved to be lemons after all. To prevent such risky
investments the National Academy of Sciences has developed a rule of thumb for deter-
mining when power-plant technology is "commercially available:" it must be in success-
ful operation for one year on a plant of at least 100 megawatts. If "adequately
demonstrated" had been equated with this standard, the EPA could not have required
FGD in 1971.
Plainly it was not for the court of appeals in Essex Chemical to impose any such
inflexible limit on the Agency's judgment, and the court was probably right in deferring
to the EPA's determination because of the limitations on judicial review. On such a
record the finding that the technology was "adequately demonstrated" could hardly be
said to be "arbitrary" or "capricious." Whether the Agency's finding was correct or not,
however, is quite another story.
Id at 1413-14.
125. Resolving the uncertainties associated with synthetic fuel projects is one of the reasons
why the Energy Security Act was enacted. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
8701(a)(3)-(a)(4), 8701(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1980). The private sector contends that the uncer-
tainties are too great to allow for its investment in synthetic fuel projects without firm government
commitments. [1980] EN. USERs ReP. (BNA) No. 381 at 3.
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adequate financial assistance can be obtained to justify construction of
a synthetic fuel project. Unfortunately, the Energy Security Act gives
no significant attention to the regulatory permits and approvals which a
synthetic fuel project must obtain. 126 The synthetic fuel project's via-
bility, as measured by the adequacy of financial assistance made avail-
able, will be directly influenced by regulatory risk. This risk, however,
is completely ignored by the Energy Security Act. Uncertainties cre-
ated by legislation and regulatory policies will not only affect project
sponsors but also the financial commitments made by the SFC. The
wisdom of allowing the SFC to have a say in regulatory policy is per-
haps debatable. 27 It is nonetheless unfortunate that the viability of the
project will be subject to uncontrolled variables in the form of non-
quantified regulatory risks that affect not only the solvency of the pro-
ject but also a substantial federal financial commitment. Since actual
project costs have recently proved to exceed significantly "initial pro-
ject cost" estimates, 128 this problem of uncontrolled risk must be tamed
if the SFC is to succeed in its stated mission of assisting the private
sector to achieve a synthetic fuel production capacity. 29
B. Common Agency Decisions Attendant with the Construction and
Operation of a Synthetic Fuel Project
It is impossible to delineate the multitude of permits and approvals
that a synthetic fuel project would have to obtain to achieve opera-
tional status. The particular type of agency decision or action required
126. Attention to the problem of regulatory requirements is mentioned only twice in the En-
ergy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8743(a) (West Supp. 1980) provides that Corpora-
tion construction projects "shall be subject to all Federal and non-discriminatory State and local
environmental, land use, and siting laws to the same extent as such laws apply to privately spon-
sored synthetic fuel projects .... " Section 8778 provides that nothing in title I of the Energy
Security Act affects, or is intended to affect, substantive rights or procedural requirements attend-
ant with water rights administered by the states. The reason for this lack of attention lies in the
assumption by the Act's sponsors that the companion Energy Mobilization Board proposal, which
did address the question of energy project permits and approvals, would be enacted at the same
time as the Energy Security Act. See id § 8775(i).
127. Giving the SFC authority to impose controls upon agency action associated with a syn-
thetic fuel plant raises the prospect that the SFC would be influenced in the exercise of its regula-
tory controls by the existence of its committed or intended commitment of financial assistance to
the synthetic fuel project. But to dissociate the SFC from agency action is to place at risk substan-
tial sums of money guaranteed by the federal government. The irony here is that the risk results
from action taken by other arms of the federal government. Some coherence and consistency in
approach by the federal government is clearly desirable. It is just as clear that it is undesirable
that the same entity should be disbursing financial assistance and controlling agency action.
128. See note 54 supra.
129. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8701(a)(4) (West Supp. 1980).
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involving a synthetic fuel project can include permits, licenses, ap-
proval of leases, certificates, rights-of-way, and approvals of financial
assistance, rates, rulings or decisions authorized, required, or issued by
any agency involved with the project. Some agency requirements de-
pend on the particular geographic site of the synthetic fuel project.
Other requirements depend on the type of technology involved. For
example, oil shale projects raise some concerns different from those in-
volving coal-based technologies. 30 Similarly, a facility designed to
produce a raw feedstock, such as kerogen from oil shale, has problems
different from a facility designed as an integrated mineral chemical
complex, such as is often envisioned for synthetic natural gas
projects.' 31 Nevertheless, it is possible to describe these general ap-
proval requirements (agency action) that would affect most synthetic
fuel projects. Indeed, any lapse is on the side of under-inclusion-a
synthetic fuel project may face greater regulatory hurdles than outlined
here but it is unlikely to face fewer.
Agency action falls into three generic categories: (1) project prepa-
ration; (2) project construction; and (3) project operation. Considera-
tion of each category is not, however, serial. One cannot totally defer
until the project is ready to enter the operational stage the obtaining of
operational permits and approvals. The categories are not defined by
the time of consideration so much as by the function which the permit
or approval controls. Overlaps are always present, if for no other rea-
son than a financial commitment to build a project cannot be under-
taken unless there is some assurance that it can be operated. 132 Yet,
130. Although both oil shale and coal based technologies raise similar generic concerns, see
note 8 supra, they involve widely different technologies and consequently give rise to problems
which are unique to each process. Particular problems associated with oil shale are discussed in
COMPENDIUM REPORTS, supra note 4, at 93-179. Particular problems associated with coal gasifi-
cation are discussed in OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE DIRECT USE OF COAL-PROSPECTS
AND PROBLEMS OF PRODUCTION AND COMBUSTION 53-104 (1979). See generally Allain, Environ-
mental Implications of a Synthetic Fuel Industry, 4 HARV. ENVIRON. L. REv. 391 (1980).
131. An integrated synthetic fuel power/chemical complex has been proposed by Ebasco
Services, Inc. It would consist of a gasification plant which used lignite as a feedstock. Heat from
the gasification process would be converted in an adjacent generating station into electricity. The
synthetic gas produced during the gasification process would be put to a variety of uses, including
pipeline sales and methanol and ammonia manufacturing. See CHEMICAL ENGINEERING PRO-
GRESS, 47-54 (March, 1980). In addition to the need to undertake a thorough economic analysis, a
complete identification of "federal permits, licenses and entitlements which must be obtained" in
connection with a project is required to comply with the Council of Environmental Quality's
regulations regarding the drafting of EIS' by federal agencies. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25(b) (1980).
132. Cf Green & Fridkis, Radiation andthe Environment, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
1022, 1033 (1974):
Issuance of the construction permit [for the nuclear reactor] is the crucial stage for safety
1981]
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clear lines of difference in function do exist and help to define the na-
ture and type of regulatory risk.
1. Project Preparation
a. Environmental Impacts
Probably the most significant preparatory requirement is the obli-
gation to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS). Although
the SFC is not required to prepare an EIS as part of its decision to
extend financial assistance, 133 this exemption does not extend to the
project itself. Consequently, when any federal agency's involvement in
a synthetic fuel project, aside from the providing of financial assistance
by the SFC, amounts to "major federal action," an EIS will have to be
prepared.'34 Since major synthetic fuel projects will involve significant
federal agency action, there is no question but that a project EIS would
be necessary. 135
and environmental considerations. Issuance of the permit signifies AEC's satisfaction
that the reactor can be operated at the specified location in accordance with the law and
with adequate safety. It also means that a tremendous investment will be made in con-
struction in the expectation that an operating license will be issued when construction
has been completed. Moreover, it is during consideration of the construction permit that
environmental issues may most effectively be raised by the public. It is useful, therefore,
to consider the licensing process, at this stage, in some detail.
Id at 1033.
The Atomic Energy Act specifically established a two-step licensing process for nuclear
power plants, id at 1032, an uncommon requirement for synthetic fuel projects. Nonetheless, the
economic considerations recounted by Green and Fridkis create the equivalent of a two-step pro-
cess for synthetic fuel projects. Economic necessity requires that essential agency action be com-
pleted, where possible, during the preconstruction period.
133. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8775(b) (West Supp. 1980): The Con-
ference Report explains:
National Environmental Policy Act: Section 175(b) provides that no action of the
Corporation, except for the construction and operation of Corporation construction
projects, shall be deemed to be a "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment" for the purposes of National Environmental Policy Act.
With respect to Corporation construction projects, the Corporation shall be deemed
to be a Federal agency for the purposes of NEPA. The Corporation itself would be
required to prepare an environmental impact statement for a Corporation construction
project. The Corporation also, as a Federal agency for such project, shall be subject to
the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines and could request the Council on En-
vironmental Quality to designate it or another agency as the lead agency in order to
expedite the preparation of an environmental impact statement at the earliest possible
time.
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43 at 234. This NEPA exemption does not apply to the "fast
start" program under the Nonnuclear Act. See 10 C.F.R. § 796.10 (1980).
134. See generaly W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.6 (1977). More-
over, state EIS requirements, id § 7.11, are not affected by the Energy Security Act.
135. Federal agency action may be implicated because the synthetic fuel project involves the
use of federal land, see Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); or requires necessary permits, licenses, or rights-of-way issued by a federal agency.
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b. Land Use Controls
Synthetic fuel projects, wherever located, must comply with appli-
cable land use controls. These controls will be generally more exten-
sive where the project site is privately rather than federally owned.
This is because the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 provided that nothing
in its provision was designed to preempt state authority to regulate fed-
eral lands. 36 This compliment to state authority does not, however,
extend to land use ordinances enacted by political subdivisions of the
states.137 Nonetheless, where privately held land is subject to local land
use ordinances, so are federal lands, to the extent that the local ordi-
nance presents "no significant threat to any identifiable federal policy
or interest."' 138 Care must also be taken to insure that this general ar-
rangement of respective sovereign authority has not been altered by
cooperative agreements between state and federal authorities 39 or by
See W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 7.6, at 762 (1977). The requirement
for a project EIS may be avoided where the project is adequately covered by a generic EIS. See
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1980).
136. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (Supp. III 1979).
137. See Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Co., 601 F.2d 1080, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 1979), aj'd, 444
U.S. 1010 (1980). Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366, 371 (W.D.
Okla. 1967), afd 406 F.2d 1303, 1304 (10th Cir. 1969). See also Note, Public Land Law: Preemp-
tion of State Regulation of Mineral Development on the Public Domain, Ventura County v. Gulf Oil
Corp. 16 TULSA L.J. 317 (1980).
138. These local ordinances may have a most significant effect upon major energy projects
where local government seeks to ameliorate the socio-economic impacts (boomtown syndrome)
resulting from the location of mammoth energy projects in sparsely populated, rural areas. The
effect of local government upon energy project construction was recently exhibited in Garfield
County, Colorado. See SynFuels 9, (McGraw-Hill, January 23, 1981) (reporting that Garfield
County Commissioners granted four special use permits for Union Oil's shale oil complex near
Parachute, Colorado, after Union agreed to advance more than $2 million in grants and loans to
the town, a school district and the county sheriff's office).
139. Cooperative agreements between federal and nonfederal agencies are becoming increas-
ingly popular as means of achieving a meaningful cooperative attitude between cosovereigns. An
example of state-federal cooperation is the cooperative agreement between the state of Wyoming
and the Department of the Interior regarding departmental adoption and implementation of coal
mining operation regulations under the Coal Leasing Amendments Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-209
(1976 & Supp. III 1979) and Wyoming's desire to reclaim land within its boundaries. See 42 Fed.
Reg. 3642 (1977). Cooperative agreements have also been entered into by the Department of the
Interior and the states of New Mexico, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,065 (1977); North Dakota, 42 Fed. Reg.
18,071 (1977); Utah, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,068 (1977); and Montana, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,862 (1977). The
cooperative agreements set forth above are in the process of being revised, pursuant to the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1273(c) (Supp. III 1979). Final rules, which
became effective June 11, 1979, regarding such cooperative agreements (30 C.F.R. § 211.77
(1979)), have been jointly approved by the Department of the Interior (Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement and the Geological Survey) and the State of Wyoming. 44 Fed.
Reg. 33,655 (1979). Proposed rules following the above agreements can be found in 44 Fed. Reg.
54, 493 (1979) concerning a proposed cooperative agreement between the Interior Department and
the state of North Dakota. While the Energy Security Act does not specifically call for coopera-
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specific congressional legislation. 4 '
c. Title to Lands Involved in Synthetic Fuel Production
There is presently some confusion over the ownership of substan-
tial tracts of rich mineral fuel resource lands in the West, notably lands
containing oil shale. This confusion has been generated by the
Supreme Court decision in Andrus v. Shell Oil Co. 141 In Andrus the
Court held that "oil shale" was a "valuable mineral deposit" which was
patentable under the savings clause of the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920.142 While the Mineral Leasing Act had operated to withdraw oil
shale lands from private entry under the Mining Law of 1872,141 the
savings clause of the Act preserved rights which had vested prior to its
enactment." Although the Court had held elsewhere that the question
whether a "valuable mineral deposit" had been discovered could be
properly determined by reference to a "marketability" test,' 41 the Court
tive agreements, it does call for cooperation between federal and state entities. Energy Security
Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8727(0(1), 8727(g) (West Supp. 1980).
140. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976); cf. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Co.,
601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 444 U.S. 1010 (1980):
Finally, we are reassured in the correctness of our decision by policy considerations
implicitly reflected in the structure and operation of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of
1920 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 ef seq. ). As
Ventura recognized in filing its second amended complaint, the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA") and the guidelines, regulations, and Executive Orders issued in
pursuance of that act, mandate extensive federal consideration and federal-local cooper-
ation concerning the local, environmental impact of federal action under the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act. If federal officials fail to comply with these requirements, Ventura
has a remedy against those officials.
Our decision does not mean that local interests will be unheard or unprotected. In
rejecting a local veto power while simultaneously guarding local concerns under NEPA,
local interests can be represented, the integrity of the federal leases and drilling permits
reconciling national energy needs and local environmental interests can be protected,
and the ultimate lessee will be responsible to a single master rather than conflicting au-
thority.
601 F.2d at 1086 (footnote omitted).
141. 48 U.S.L.W. 4603 (1980).
142. Id at 4606. The Savings Clause is set forth in § 37 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30
U.S.C. § 193 (1976).
143. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4604.
144. Id
145. Id at 4604 n.4:
In Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313 (1950), this Court approved the Department of
Interior's "prudent-man test" under which discovery of a "valuable mineral deposit"
requires proof of a deposit of such character that "a person of ordinary prudence would
be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect
of success, in developing a valuable mine." Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455, 457 (1894).
Accord, Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 335-63 (1962); Cameron v.
United States, 252 U.S. 450, 459 (1920). In United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599
(1968), the Court approved the Department's marketability test-whether a mineral can
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declined to use, or allow the use of, the marketability test in Andrus.
The Court based its decision upon a finding that the "legislative history
of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 shows that Congress did not con-
sider 'present marketability' a prerequisite to the patentability of oil
shale."' 46 Thus, the fact that oil shale could not be marketed at a profit
when entry was made, 47 was not dispositive. Nothing in Andrus ex-
cuses the claimant from complying with other requirements attendant
with entry, such as assessment work,' for which lack of compliance
may allow the government to cancel the claim.14 9
The result is that a cloud over title exists on substantial tracts of oil
shale lands in the West. Until these claims are resolved, project spon-
sors will be understandably hesitant to consider those lands for syn-
thetic fuel projects.15 0 Indeed, since the SFC is on a tight schedule for
disbursement of financial assistance,' 5 ' it is altogether probable that
any tracts of land embroiled in title disputes will be ignored for pur-
poses of synthetic fuel development through SFC financial assistance.
d. Project Site Selection
Potentially valuable tracts of land for synthetic fuel projects are
not all equally accessible to development. Numerous statutes exist
be "extracted, removed and marketed at a profit"-deeming it a logical complement of
the prudent-man standard.
1d
146. Id at 4605.
147. Id at 4606.
148. See Hickel v. Oil Shale Co., 400 U.S. 48 (1970).
149. Id at 57-58.
150. Cf. Champlin Refining Co. v. Aladdin Petro Corp., 205 Okla. 524, 238 P.2d 827 (1951)
(where title from sovereign fails, occupier of property is liable in trespass to rightful owner). See
generally 1 H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 225-229 (1978). Under the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (West Supp. 1980),
owners of unpatented lode or placer mining claims located prior to October 21, 1976 are required
to file a notice of intention to hold the mining claim, id § 1744(a), and a copy of the official record
of the notice of location or certificate of location, including a description of the location of the
claimed lands on the ground. Id § 1744(b). The failure to file the required instruments is statuto-
rily deemed to be conclusive evidence of abandonment of the claim. Id at § 1744(c). In Topaz
Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 309 (D. Utah 1979), regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of Interior to carry out the filing provisions of § 1744 were upheld and the government
was held to be entitled to institute contest actions, 43 C.F.R. § 4.451-1 (1978), based exclusively
upon its own records in determining to whom notice must be given. 479 F. Supp. at 312-13. The
right of the government to impose these additional filing requirements is established by Cameron
v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 460 (1920) and Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 476-78 (1963). See
also Andrus v. Aliard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1980).
151. See note 49 supra.
1981]
31
Fischer: The New Synthetic Fuels Program: Boomlet or Bust
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1980
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:357
which place constraints upon the use of paticular sites for synthetic fuel
projects.
The Historic Sites, Buildings and Antiquities Act of 1935 t52 re-
quires that federal lands destined for commercial development must be
surveyed to determine the threat to historical, scientific, or archeologi-
cal materials. 153 If any such materials are found, alternatives must be
considered to avoid irreparable losses.
1 54
The Endangered Species Act of 1973'5 provides that it must be
insured that a project "authorized, funded or carried out" by a federal
instrumentality, department or agency "is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence" of any endangered species or their habitats.' 56
Species may be listed as "endangered" by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior157 or by the state in which the project is located.15 8 Species may be
exempted from the requirements of the Act by the Endangered Species
Committee.'5 9
The bald and golden eagles are provided specific statutory protec-
tion' 60 as are migratory birds in general.' 6' Care must be taken to in-
152. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1974).
153. Id §§ 469-469(a)(2).
154. Id Similarly, although no permit process is involved, under the National Historic Pres-
ervation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470N (1974), federally financed, assisted or permitted
projects cannot impact properties listed on the National Register of Historic Places unless no alter-
natives exist. See also Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1974) (requiring a permit
from area federal land manager prior to any disturbance of any designated historic or archaeo.
logical landmarks).
155. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1974).
156. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West Supp. 1980).
157. Id § 1533. Authority to maintain and revise lists of endangered species and habitats has
been delegated to the Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. 35 Fed. Reg. 8491,
8493 (1970); 39 Fed. Reg. 1144, 1145 (1974). Lists of endangered species can be found at 50
C.F.R. § 17.1 1-.12 (1979). The locations of the critical habitat of several known species have been
identified. This information, however, is only a partial basis for excluding potential sites, since
many new species will probably be added to the endangered list and an EIS required for a new
energy facility can identify new endangered species not previously encountered.
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(0 (1976).
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (Supp. 11 1976).
160. Id §§ 668-668d (1976). The Bald and Golden Eagle Act is administered by the Fish and
Wildlife Service, acting for the Secretary of the Interior. Regulations implementing the Act are
found at 50 C.F.R., §§ 11.1-.26, 14.1-.83, 21.1-.46 (1979). A 1978 amendment to the Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-616, § 9, 92 Stat. 3114, amending 16 U.S.C. § 668a, undercut the protection afforded golden
eagles by specifically authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits for the taking of
golden eagle nests which interfere with resource development or recovery operations. Regulations
implementing this amendment have been proposed. 45 Fed. Reg. 809 (1980).
161. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-708, 709(a)-711 (1976). The Migratory Bird
Treaty Act is administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service, acting for the Secretary of the Inte-
rior. Regulations implementing the Act are found at 50 C.F.R., §§ 20.1-.143, 21.1-.46 (1979). Ad-
ministration of the Act must take into consideration the requirements of the Endangered Species
32
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss3/1
19811 SYNTHETIC FUELS
sure that the synthetic fuel project does not adversely affect the birds,
their nests, or migrations.
Wilderness areas162 are generally open to resource development or
recovery operations, although such activities are strictly regulated and
controlled.1 63  Wild and scenic rivers164 are largely foreclosed to re-
source development or recovery operations which interfere with their
pristine and natural quality.'65
Where mining activities are to be carried on in connection with a
specific synthetic fuel project,'6 6 the Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act must be considered. 67  At the present time regulations
under this Act apply to coal mining,168 but legislation to bring non-coal
minerals under similar controls is likely to be proposed. 69 The ap-
proving agency is the Office of Surface Mining of the Department of
the Interior.170
Although the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act is not
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167
(D.D.C. 1977).
162. Wilderness areas are designed pursuant to the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131-1136
(1976). Designated wilderness areas are set forth at 16 U.S.C. § 1132. Wilderness areas must be
designated as such by Congress. Id. § 1131(a).
163. Id § 1133.
164. Wild and scenic rivers are designated pursuant to the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1976). Rivers may be designed as wild and scenic: (1) by act of congress or
(2) after designation by the legislature of the state or states through which the rivers flow, or, upon
application by the governor of the state or governors of the states through which the rivers flow, by
the Secretary of the Interior. 16 U.S.C. § 1273 (1976). The Act distinguishes between designated
rivers, 16 U.S.C. § 1274 (1976), and rivers constituting potential additions to the national wild and
scenic river system, 16 U.S.C. § 1276 (1976).
165. Id § 1278.
166. This will be common since it would prove uneconomical to transport the mineral fuel
resource any significant distance prior to its conversion to a synthetic fuel. Even after the mineral
fuel resource has been converted to a transportable fuel, significant economic problems remain.
See U.S. ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, ENERGY FROM THE WEST-POLICY ANALYSIS REPORT,
INTERAGENCY ENERGY/ENvIRONMENT R & D PROGRAM REPORT 610-85 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as POLICY ANALYSIS REPORT].
167. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1976).
168. Id. §§ 1201-1202, 1251-1279. The regulations are found at 30 C.F.R., §§ 700.1-890.23
(1979).
169. Statutory authority for designating certain lands as unsuitable for non-coal mining is
contained in § 601 of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1281 (Supp.
III 1976). The authority is, however, limited to areas where non-coal mining would adversely
affect lands used primarily for residential or related purposes. Id § 1281(b). Senator Hart (Colo-
rado) introduced a measure which would have extended protections similar to those found in the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act to oil shale development. S. 859, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980). The measure, however, was not reported out of committee.
170. 30 C.F.R. § 700.1-.15 (1980). Senator Hart's measure, see note 170 supra, would have
likewise placed regulatory authority over oil shale development in the Office of Surface Mining.
S. 859, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1980).
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directly applicable to oil shale development, such projects on federal
land remain subject to extensive reclamation controls at both the fed-
eral 7 ' and state level. 172
e. Site Evaluation
Before any decision to proceed with a synthetic fuel project can be
undertaken, the site must be extensively surveyed and explored if any
type of on-site or nearby mining for feedstock is anticipated. Access to
federal lands, which comprise the public domain, for mineral explora-
tion and evaluation is subject to permit issues by the United States Ge-
ological Survey Service of the Department of the Interior.173  The
Geological Survey will require that detailed exploration and mining
plans be prepared and submitted along with annual operations re-
ports. 74 Similar requirements are involved if the project site is on land
administered by the Forest Service. 17  The methods of exploration
used will be subject to regulatory control where the exploratory activity
occurs in the national forests 176 or the public domain. 177 Care must
171. Oil shale leases are obtained pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 241 (1976) which provides, "[Oil
Shale] Leases may be for indeterminate periods, upon such conditions as may be imposed by the
Secretary of the Interior, including covenants relative to methods of mining, prevention of waste,
and productive development." Id Pursuant to this provision, oil shale leases are subject to the
general provisions governing surface exploration, mining, and reclamation set forth in 43 C.F.R.
§ 23.1-.13 (1980). A permit and bond, "sufficient to satisfy the reclamation requirements of an
approved exploration or mining plan," are required. Id § 23.9. The Mineral Leasing Act also
imposes reclamation controls upon any project on federal lands which requires pipeline rights-of-
way where that project may have "a significant impact on the environment." 30 U.S.C. § 185(h)
(1976). The project sponsor must satisfy reclamation requirements which include the "restoration,
revegetation, and curtailment of erosion of the surface land," associated with the pipeline con-
struction. Id
Examples of the Department of Interior's attitudes toward oil shale development on federal
land can be found in the lease stipulations required under the Federal Prototype Oil Shale Leas-
ing Program. See ENERGY FROM THE WEST III, supra note 8, at 140 (leases require the lessee to
"backfill and/or reclaim excavated material and processed shale and compact it thoroughly; de-
sign slope faces of waste piles to insure slope stability; revegetate slope faces and other areas in
accordance with the rehabilitation plan; and comply with numerous requirements for the restora-
tion of the disturbed land.").
172. See, e.g., Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Act, CoLO. REv. STAT. § 34-32-101 (Cum.
Supp. 1979) which specifically applies to oil shale mining. The Act is administered by the Colo-
rado Land Reclamation Board. A permit and bond is required. Id at §§ 34-32-103(F); 34-32-110.
173. 43 C.F.R. § 23.3 (1980).
174. Id § 23.8.
175. The Secretary of Agriculture has authority under 16 U.S.C. §§ 478, 551 (1976) to promul-
gate regulations concerning the methods of prospecting and mining in national forests. Regula-
tions implementing this statutory authority are found at 36 C.F.R. § 252.1-.15 (1980).
176. 36 C.F.R. §§ 252.4(a) (1978) (requiring the submission and approval of a "plan of opera-
tion" with respect to mining activity "which might cause disturbance of surface resources").
177. 43 C.F.R. § 23.4 (1980) ("No person shall, in any manner or by any means which will
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also be taken that state requirements and any cooperative agreements
entered into between state and federal authorities be examined to de-
termine all limitations upon exploratory activity.'78
2. Project Construction
The synthetic fuel project includes not only the plant facility for
obtaining the synthetic fuel but also all related facilities, such as mines,
disposal sites, access roads, on-site transmission facilities, refineries,
and on-site end users of the synthetic fuel feedstock.'79 Thus, the scope
of activities considered under this generic topic ranges from actual site
preparation to complete erection of the synthetic fuel project.
a. Site Preparation
Certain permits and approvals that will have to be obtained if the
synthetic fuel project is to be located on federal land find their statutory
basis in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA).' 8° Under the FLPMA, permits and approvals for a variety
of activities involving the use of federal lands 8' must be obtained
before the activity is undertaken. Such activities include: rights-of-way
for tunnels, canals, and roads; 8 2 communications; 183 pipelines for the
cause the surface of lands to be disturbed, explore, test, or prospect for minerals (other than oil
and gas) subject to disposition under the mineral leasing acts. . without first filing an applica-
tion for, and obtaining, a permit, lease or contract which authorizes such exploring, testing, or
prospecting."); id § 23.7 (requiring the submission by the operator of an exploration plan with the
mining supervisor before the operator commences any surface disturbing operations to explore,
test, or prospect for minerals covered by the mineral leasing act). See also 43 C.F.R. § 3510.0-3 to
.1-2 (1979) (prospecting permits).
178. See 30 C.F.R. § 745.1-.16 (1980) (setting forth guidelines for state-federal cooperative
agreements under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1978). There is presently
no statutory authority for state-federal cooperative agreements with respect to oil shale develop-
ment, although Senator Hart's measure, see note 169 supra, would correct this deficiency. To date,
oil shale development has proceeded almost totally under federal control only. See OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, AN ASSESSMENT OF OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, VOLUME II: A HISTORY
AND ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL PROTOTYPE OIL SHALE LEASING PROGRAM (1980) [hereinafter
cited as HISTORY OF OIL SHALE LEASING PROGRAM].
179. See note 131 supra.
180. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976).
181. The FLPMA is limited to public lands as that term is defined in the Act:
The term "public lands" means any land and interest in land owned by the United States
within the several States and administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the
Bureau of Land Management, without regard to how the United States acquired owner-
ship, except-
(1) lands located on the Outer Continental Shelf; and
(2) lands held for the benefit of Indians, Aleuts, and Eskimos.
Id § 1702(e).
182. Id § 1761(a)(6); 43 C.F.R. §§ 2821.0-3 to 1821.6-2, 2822.0-3 to 2822.2-2 (1979).
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transportation of liquids and gases other than water, oil, natural gas,
synthetic fuel, or gaseous fuel, or product refined therefrom; 84 power
transmission;185 and impoundment of water.' 86  Approvals for the
clearance, removal and hauling of timber minerals,1 87 and special use
permits for temporary facilities, such as sanitary facilities,'88 will have
to be obtained in connection with any synthetic fuel project. In addi-
tion, permits will have to be acquired from the regulatory agency with
statutory authority over that portion of the project for which the right-
of-way is needed.'89 Generally, agencies with substantive decision-
making functions over the facilities for which the right-of-way is sought
will automatically issue the necessary permits, licenses, and approvals.
Any equipment used to prepare the site must meet design and op-
eration standards set by the Department of Labor under authority pro-
vided by the Occupational Safety and Health Act.'90
Under the Antiquities Act of 1906,91 any archaeological items dis-
covered during exploration of the project site will require a permit to
allow the items to be studied and removed. 92 Activities at the project
site may be impeded or even halted while the discovery is inventoried
and studied.'93
183. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(5) (1976); 43 C.F.R. §§ 2861.0-3 to .1,, 2862.0-3 to .1 (1979).
184. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(2) (1976). Pipelines for the conveyance of exempted products are
covered by separate provisions, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1974); 43 C.F.R. §§ 2881.0-3 to .3, 2882.0-3
(1979).
185. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(4) (1976); 43 C.F.R. §§ 2850.0-3 to 0-8, 2851.1-.3 (1979).
186. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(1) (1976); 43 C.F.R. §§ 1871.0-3 to .1, 2872.0-3 to .6, 2873.0.3 to .1
(1979).
187. 43 U.S.C. § 1764(0 (1976); 43 C.F.R. § 2891.0-3 to .1-3 (1979).
188. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2920.0-2 to .7, 2921.0-6 to .4, 2922.0-7 to .1, 2923.1 to .4-2 (1979).
189. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration requires that notice be provided to the
agency prior to the construction of tall structures such as emission stacks or communication tow-
ers. 14 C.F.R. § 77.11-.19 (1980). Similarly, the Federal Communication System requires that a
license be obtained for a radio communication system. 47 C.F.R. § 1.511-.615 (1979).
190. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
191. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1974); see note 154 supra.
192. 43 C.F.R. § 3.1-.17 (1980). Permits for the examination of ruins, the excavation of arche-
ological sites, and the gathering of objects of antiquities on Indian tribal lands are obtained under
25 C.F.R. § 132.1-.9 (1980).
193. Cf. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (affirming injunction which curtailed
pumping of water from hydrological formation to extent pumping reduced water level of forma-
tion necessary to protect the formation's scientific value as natural habitat of pupfish); WATCH
(Waterbury Action To Conserve Our Heritage, Inc.) v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d. Cir. 1979) (re-
quiring HUD to assume a continuing responsibility of compliance with environmental objectives
expressed in NEPA and articulated in congressional legislation designed to encourage historic
preservation); Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 378 F. Supp. 240, 251 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
(failure of Army Corps of Engineers to complete further procedures pursuant to § 2(b) of Execu-
tive Order 11,593, implementing National Registration of Historic Places Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470,
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Under the Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA), 194 all mining ac-
tivities associated with the project must meet MSHA standards. 195 An
approved mine safety and health plan must be in place.196 Opening
and closing of mines require formal notification to the Mine Safety and
Health Administration.
197
Site preparation may raise problems under the Clean Air Act' 98
through the creation of emissions generated by operations and equip-
ment brought into the area.' 99 To the extent either event results in the
restricts Corps from disturbing known or suspected archeological sites within the particular arche-
ological district).
194. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-960 (1971). The coverage of MSHA is quite broad. Id §§ 802(h),
803 (West Supp. 1980). In addition, many areas of concern under MSHA are also subject to
standards established by OSHA. Because of the overlapping coverage, an interagency agreement
was executed between OSHA and MSHA on March 29, 1979. The agreement provided that
MSHA would have primary responsibility with respect to unsafe and unhealthful working condi-
tions on minesites and in milling operations. Where MSHA did not apply or where no MSHA
regulations existed for particular working conditions, OSHA would apply. A process was devel-
oped for resolving uncertainties about jurisdiction. See OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5,
at 325.
195. 30 C.F.R., ch. 1 (1980).
196. Approved plans are required for a variety of mining activities. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R.
§ 75.200-2 (roof control plans), § 75.316 (ventilation system and methane and dust control plan),
§ 75.517-2 (insulation of existing bare wires and cables plan) (1980). Plans are filed with the
District Manager of the Coal Mine Safety District in which the mine is located. The above re-
quirements apply specifically to underground coal mines. Mine safety and health standards have
not, as yet, been specifically promulgated for oil shale mines. When such regulations are promul-
gated, it is likely that they will substantially follow existing mine health and safety standards
applicable to surface and underground coal mines. 30 C.F.R. §§ 70.1-77.1916 (1980). At present,
oil shale mining is regulated under provisions of the MSHA dealing with Metal and Nonmetallic
Mine Safety. 30 C.F.R. §§ 55.1-.26, 57.1-.26.
An example of some of the difficulties presented by MSHA to oil shale mining is shown by
the treatment of underground fires which are generally prohibited. 30 C.F.R. § 57.4 (1980). Oil
shale operators using in situ retorting have therefore had to negotiate a special modification agree-
ment before each burn. These agreements typically require: (1) twice the normal mine ventila-
tion; (2) constant monitoring of carbon monoxide, methane, hydrogen sulfide, and oxygen; (3) that
retort chambers be maintained below ambient pressure during the burn; (4) compressed air life-
support refuges be located throughout the mine; (5) instant-on backup power supplies; and, (6)
retort gases to be monitored. Regulations promulgated by the Geological Survey which govern
general development, mining, and processing of natural resources on federal land would also be
applicable to the above-ground retort and modified in-situ methods of oil shale recovery. 30
C.F.R. § 231.1(a) (1980). Under this authority the operator of an oil shale project, before con-
ducting any operations, must submit for approval a mining plan which must show in detail,
among others, measures taken to prevent hazards to public health and safety. Id § 231.10(7).
Indeed, the mining supervisor, id § 231.2(c), is specifically directed to insure that sanitary, wel-
fare, health, and safety arrangements are consistent with regulations under MHSA governing
metal and nonmetal mines. Id § 231.25.
197. 30 C.F.R. §§ 57.26 (1980) (metal and nonmetal mine), 30 C.F.R. § 75.1721 (1980) (under-
ground coal mine) (1980), 30 C.F.R. § 77.1712 (1980) (surface coal mines); see note 131, supra.
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. III 1979).
199. Many areas in which synthetic fuel industries will be located have background pollution
levels which at times exceed current ambient air quality standards. See OIL SHALE TECHNOLO-
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violation of air quality standards, it may be necessary for the project to
engage in expensive emission controls. These controls may, in turn,
require additional permits as, for example, where water is diverted to
reduce fugitive dust."co Similarly, site preparation activities may result
in discharges into water courses or groundwater aquifers which necessi-
tate the acquisition of another permit.20'
b. Plant Construction
The actual construction of the synthetic fuel plant and its related
facilities involves a plethora of statutory requirements administered by
regulatory agencies.
The Noise Control Act 2 and the Quiet Communities Act 20 3 pre-
scribe noise standards that will be applicable to the synthetic fuel pro-
ject. The Noise Control Act requires that equipment, such as air
compressors and transportation devices, meets statutory and regulatory
standards of quietness.2°4 Under the Quiet Communities Act, mining
and mine processing facilities may be required to meet ambient noise
GIES, sura note 5, at 266. It is presently believed that the background levels are not a health
hazard and are not significantly affected by anticipated synthetic fuel projects. See note 214 iqfra.
200. Control of water rights is primarily vested with the states. The Energy Security Act con-
tains express provisions guaranteeing state control of water resources. Energy Security Act, stpra
note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8778 (West Supp. 1980). The Conference Report reemphasizes the point:
This section provides that nothing in this part shall affect the jurisdiction of States
or the Federal government over water, affect any interstate compact, or confer on any
nonFederal entity the ability to exercise any Federal right to water. No project con-
structed pursuant to the authorities of the part shall be considered to be a Federal project
for purposes of the application for or an assignment of water rights.
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 227. The language of § 178 and the Conference Report
evidence that synthetic fuel projects are subject to state substantive and procedural requirements
attendant with the acquisition of water rights.
201. No discharge of any pollutant from a point source is permitted without the prior ob-
taining of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Standard (NPDES) permit. In Colorado,
where the major focus of synthetic fuel development is expected, the NPDES permit is adminis-
tered by the State Water Quality Control Commission. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-201 (1973). Use
or disruption of underground waters or aquifers is covered both by federal law, see Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899, § 15, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976) (albeit to a limited extent, see W. RODGERS,
HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.5 (1977)), and the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. § 300f, and by state law, see Colorado Groundwater Management Act, COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-90-101 (1973). The disruption of underground aquifiers is of particular importance in the
field of synthetic fuel development, see SYNTHETIC FUELS DEVELOPMENT-EARTH-SCIENCE CON-
SIDERATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR/GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 14 (1979), because a disrup-
tion of certain types of drinking water aquifiers can lead to the withdrawal of federal assistance for
a project which causes the disruption. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(h)-3(e) (1976).
202. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1977).
203. Pub. Law No. 95-609, 92 Stat. 3079 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 4905, 4910, 4913,4918 (Supp.
1980)).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 4905(c) (1976).
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standards set for site boundaries. °5
To the extent any activities duplicate those carried on during the
pre-construction phase, permits and approvals obtained and regulatory
standards complied with must be maintained. 0 6 All permit and ap-
proval applications and compliances with regulatory standards should
take into consideration all stages of the construction process for which
the same type of permit or approval or regulatory standard may be
applicable. 0 7
3. Project Operation
Synthetic fuel projects will face significant environmental con-
straints which will affect project operations. In addition, many of the
statutory and accompanying regulatory programs applicable at earlier
stages of the synthetic fuel project, such as OSHA, MSHA, and
FLPMA, are carried over to the project operation stage.
The synthetic fuel project will engage almost all of the significant
environmental legislation enacted by Congress over the last decade.
This is because the environmental consequences of a synthetic fuel pro-
ject are awesome, as can be shown by a review of an oil shale synthetic
fuel project.208
Oil shale project operation will cause major disruption of land
where mining endeavors to exploit the shale are conducted. The quan-
tities of the overburden, raw shale, and spent shale will vary with min-
ing techniques. Each technique will, however, have potential
monumental impacts on the physical environment. If open pit mining
is used, great quantities of overburden must be removed, handled and
205. 42 U.S.C. § 4913(c) (Supp. 11 1979).
206. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1976).
207. For example, a federal license is required as a condition to dealing with explosives. This
license is administered by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms of the Treasury Depart-
ment. 27 C.F.R. § 181.1-.200 (1980). The transport of the explosives to the mine site requires the
approval of the Department of Transportation. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 171.1-177.861 (1979). Actual
use of the explosives must be in accordance with the mining plan. See note 195 supra.
208. Oil shale development has received extensive scrutiny with respect to its effect on the
environment. For this reason, the discussion in the text is limited to one synthetic fuel technology.
The discussion relies extensively upon OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5. Coal based syn-
thetic fuel technologies raise similar environmental concerns, although significant differences do
exist. See ENERGY FROM THE WEST I, supra note 8, (summarizing the impact of various synthetic
fuel technologies used to exploit the mineral resource.); SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL: STATUS AND
OUTLOOK OF COAL GASIFICATION AND LIQUEFICATION (Committee Print 1979) (evaluating coal
based synthetic fuel technologies); See generally, Allain, Environmental lmplications of a Synthetic
Fuel industry, 4 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 391 (1980).
1981]
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contained. Problems associated with controlling large volumes of over-
burden are reduced with underground and in situ mining methods.
One study has estimated that a one million barrel per-day industry us-
ing above-ground mining would require the processing of six hundred
million tons of raw oil shale per year and the disposal of ten billion
cubic feet of compacted spent shale.209 Oil shale mining, like coal min-
ing, will have a significant impact upon the land surface. Numerous
uncertainties still exist regarding the adequacy of land restoration and
revegetation as well as the strategies to control the leaching of solid
waste from spent and raw oil shale.210 These uncertainties will enhance
the prospect of project delay.
Air quality disruption will occur at all stages of oil shale produc-
tion. Oil shale mining and processing will produce atmospheric emis-
209. OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at 328. On a more site specific basis it has been
estimated that the raw material needs for a project 40,000 bbl/d. operation amount to 73,700 tons
of raw shale (averaging 30 gallons of shale oil/ton) per day. The mining and retorting processes
will generate about 60,000 tons of spent shale to be disposed of each day. COMPENDIUM REPORTS,
supra note 4, at 98.
210. COMPENDIUM REPORTS, supra note 4, at 103, 108; OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, Supra note
5, at 239; U.S. ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, ENERGY FROM THE WEST, IMPACT ANALYSIS RE-
PORT 2: SITE SPECIFIC AND REGIONAL IMPACT ANALYSES 841-48 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
ENERGY FROM THE WEST II]. Solid wastes raise issues of particular concern as evidenced by a
recent presentation by Dr. David Stephan, Director, Industrial Environmental Research Labora-
tory, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency:
There are a variety of synfuel-related solid waste problems as well. Both oil shale
mining and coal mining produce enormous amounts of solid waste. Many of the mining
problems are similar to those encountered with conventional coal mining and can be
solved similarly. Surface reclamation techniques for strip mined areas are particularly
successful at least where an adequate water budget exists. The solid residues of oil shale
retorting and coal conversion are, however, another problem. Shale oil production, for
example, produces spent shale that is greater in volume than the shale originally re-
moved from the ground; coal conversion technologies, both gasification and direct lique-
faction will produce vast quantities of ash. Each of these wastes will most likely contain
a wide variety of potentially harmful components and will have to be properly managed.
It has been estimated that a commercial-scale coal gasification plant would produce up
to a million tons of coal ash wastes per year and these wastes may contain hazardous
trace elements such as arsenic, cadmium, lead and mercury. Some special wastes from
synfuel plants such as spent catalyst from coal conversion may be classified a "hazard-
ous" under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
There is also concern about the possible toxicity of liquid synthetic fuels themselves
both from the handling and usage standpoints, including concern for both industrial
employees and the general public. Coal-derived liquid fuels, particularly those produced
by direct liquefaction, are of the most concern. These liquid fuels are not of the same
composition as ordinary crude oil products. They are higher in nitrogen content, yield-
ing higher NOx levels upon combustion and they tend to contain more substances which
are potentially mutagenic or carcinogenic so that public exposure to them through nor-
mal usage might represent a significant health problem. More data are needed, however,
on both conventional petroleum products and synthetic fuels in this regard.
D. Stephan, EPA's Approach To Regulating New Energy Technologies (September 28, 1980) (pa-
per presented at the Water Pollution Control Federation Annual Conference) (copy on file with
author) [hereinafter cited as New Energy Technologies].
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sions, including those pollutants for which NAAQS have been
established2 ' as well as currently unregulated pollutants.2 12
Emissions of particulate matter and gases will result from blasting
to loosen the shale for retorting.213  Atmospheric emissions will be
greater where surface mining is used because of the larger quantities of
materials that must be handled. Particulates will likely increase due to
road dust arising from transportation of the raw material and overbur-
den.214 Emissions will also result from the various retorting technolo-
gies used.21 These emissions will be augmented if the waste gases are
used in any cogeneration processes or if on-site power generation is
contemplated as a part of synthetic fuel projects.2 6
The processed shale may also create air quality problems. Particu-
211. These include: sulphur dioxide, particulates, carbon monoxide, ozone, lead and nitrogen
oxides. OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at 260.
212. These include: silica, sulphur compounds, metals, carbon dioxide, ammonia, trace or-
ganic and trace elements. Id
213. Potentially hazardous substances (silica, salts, mercury, lead) may be released during
blasting. Methane may be released from undergound gas deposits, and carbon monoxide, nitro-
gen oxide and hydrocarbons may be emitted by incomplete combustion of fuel oil used for blast-
ing. Id
214. Id
215. Id at 260-61. See New Energy Technologies, supra note 210, at 5:
Synthetic fuels processes are receiving our most serious attention because synfuel
development activity is clearly intensifying, because of our concern over the unknown
nature of the pollutants which may be generated, and because of EPA's recognition that
the enormous capital outlays involved m building these facilities during the next decade
dictates the earliest possible and most stable possible environmental regulations for this
new industry. It is expected that pollutants coming from coal conversion and shale oil
production will be more diverse in composition than those produced by direct fossil fuel
combination. The burning of fossil fuels in conventional processes involves complete
oxidation (or attempts thereat) whereas synthetic fuels are produced under reducing con-
ditions using less air than is required for complete combustion. The result is that a wide
variety of high molecular weight organics, reduced sulfur compounds, and other poten-
tially toxic compounds are formed, presenting a different array of pollutants than have
been dealt with in the past.
We believe the air pollution problems may be particularly serious. The synthetic
fuel industry is expected to produce a wide range of air emissions with potentially ad-
verse environmental effects if not adequately controlled. Oil shale retorting, for exam-
ple, will emit nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, reduced sulfur species, ammonia, various
volatile and partially oxidized organics and, of course, particulate matter. In addition,
otentially hazardous trace elements such as arsenic, boron, and mercury may be re-
eased. Moreover, much of the oil shale development will occur within a 50-mile diame-
ter area in Colorado adjacent to Class I air quality areas. The Prevention of Significant
Deterioration increments available may well pose serious problems. The air pollution
problems associated with coal gasification and liquefaction are similar in many ways to
those for oil shale. These processes can generate significant quantities of particulates,
sulfur compounds, trace metals, high molecular weight hydrocarbons and sulfur com-
pounds, trace metals, high molecular weight hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides, etc. The
sulphur species may be particularly troublesome.
Id
216. Id at 261; COMPENDIUM REPORTS, supra note 4, at 162-65.
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late emissions from fugitive dust and spent shale handled in disposal
contain certain toxic trace metals. Spent shale may release gases, am-
monia, and hydrogen sulfide as it is treated after retorting and during
handling processes.21 7 Particulate problems are most severe for tech-
nologies that result in very fine rather than coarse spent shale.21
Development and operation of oil shale facilities risk contamina-
tion of surface and ground waters from a number of sources, including:
point sources, such as cooling water discharges; 219 nonpoint sources,
such as runoff, leaehing, and erosion;220 and accidental discharges, such
as spills from carriers, pipeline leaks or failures of storage containers.22
The types of contaminants produced include increased salinity, oil, sus-
pended solids, temperature alteration, and toxic substances.222 Water
quality questions are affected by the unevenness of surface and ground
water in active oil shale regions. 223 The problem is aggravated by the
presence of two bedrock aquifiers in the oil shale region. The two
aquifiers are separated by a "confining layer of rich oil shale known as
the Mahogany Zone. '224 In general, the upper aquifier contains higher
quality water than the lower one.225 Although some mixing between
the aquifiers is normal,226 there is concern that any significant disrup-
tion of the confining layer or of the normal flow of subsurface waters227
would produce undesirable consequences.228
217. COMPENDIUM REPORTS, supra note 4, at 166-67.
218. OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at 261.
219. Id at 291.
220. Id
221. Id
222. Id at 295-96. The retort and condensate water produced during the operation of the
facility will contain inorganic materials, such as ammonium, carbon dioxide, sodium, magnesium,
calcium, bicarbonate and sulfate, see COMPENDIUM REPORTS, supra note 4, at 158-61, as well as
numerous trace metals, such as lead, mercury, arsenic, zinc, maganese, clorium and vanadium, Id
See also ENERGY FROM THE WEST II, supra note 210, at 836-41.
223. Id at 296.
224. Id at 373-74. The Mahogany Zone contains oil shale yielding up to 70 gal./ton, id at 96,
and underlies an area of more than 1,200 mi.li-22 in the Piceance Basin. Id at 98. There are oil
shale formations above and below the Mahogany Zone. Id at 95-98.
225. Id at 297.
226. Id at 373-74.
227. See COMPENDIUM REPORTS, supra note 4, at 93-94. Water quality is generally best close
to the source of recharge. Because recharge sites are generally in the mountains, water quality
generally decreases as elevation decreases.
228. OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at 307-08; New Energy Technologies, supra
note 210, at 4-5:
Water-related environmental problems from synfuel production may be just as
complex. The oil shale industry will need copious water supplies for cooling, compac-
tion of spent shale, and for revegetation of surface mining areas. Coal miing and coal
conversion will also have substantial water requirements for process uses and revegeta-
[Vol. 16:357
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With these various environmental concerns are numerous federal
substantive statutory schemes which provide a regulatory framework to
control the operation of the synthetic fuel project.
As major, new, stationary sources of pollutants, 229 it would be ex-
pected that synthetic fuel projects would be required to comply with
New Source Performance Standards (NSPS).23° This is not so. The
lack of existing commercial synthetic fuel plants and the consequent
absence of a data base has convinced the EPA not to attempt formula-
tion of NSPS for commercial synthetic fuel projects. Rather, the EPA
will join in the creation of "Pollution Control Guidance Documents"
[PCGDs] for the synthetic fuel industry. 3 These PCGDs are not le-
tion. Supply of water for these activities will be particularly crucial at some sites in the
arid western part of the country where oil shale retorting and some mine-mouth coal
conversion will occur. At other sites, mine dewatering and retort-produced water from
shale oil production will produce excess water. Among the water pollution problems of
concern, spent shale, if not properly handled, could create serious water quality
problems from the leaching of soluble contaminants into nearby ground or surface wa-
ters. With underground, modified in situ operations being considered for oil shale, and
possibly for coal, the opportunity for groundwater contamination is even more likely
than for surface operations. Here again, the problem is particularly serious in the west-
er part of the country where groundwater is a vital resource. From all types of synthetic
fuel operations, raw process water discharges will be highly contaminated by toxic
materials (most likely including carcinogens, mutagens, etc.) which would represent ma-
jor threats to both surface and groundwaters if not properly controlled. It is expected
that synfuel facilities will utilize process water recycling to a great extent but this may
not totally solve the water pollution problems at all locations.
229. A stationary source, as defined in 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(d) (1979), is subject to New Source
Performance Standards if it contains an affected facility, as defined in 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(e) (1979),
the construction or modification of which is commenced after the date of publication of any stan-
dard or proposed standard applicable to that facility. 40 C.F.R. § 60.1 (1980). When construction
is deemed to have "commenced" is defined at 40 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1980).
230. The EPA was directed to publish a list of categories of stationary sources and issue regu-
lations setting NSPSs for the sources within these categories. Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 109(c)(2),
109(c)(3), 91 Stat. 700-701. The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act directed the EPA to
expedite promulgation of NSPSs for all major stationary sources. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(b) (West
Supp. 1980). NSPSs have been developed for several facilities, such as fossil fuel fired steam
generators, petroleum refineries, and refinery claus sulphur recovery plants.
231. The NSPS established for fossil fuel fired steam generators, petroleum refineries, and
refinery claus sulphur recovery plants will likely serve as guidelines regarding appropriate pollu-
tion standards developed in the PCGDs for oil shale projects:
Although I shall emphasize in the following discussion, as the Federation has re-
quested, EPA's regulatory approach for new energy technologies, I should also mention
the already-established technologies that are being expanded or the new technologies
that are very similar to existing ones. For these technologies, we can and will use our
conventional regulatory techniques: the promulgation of effluent guidelines, the defini-
tion of Best Available Treatment Economically Achievable (BATEA), the issuance of
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, etc. in water, the
establishment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) and the definition of New
Source Peformance Standards (NSPS), etc. in air, and the definition of hazardous sub-
stances and issuance of disposal facility permits, etc. for hazardous solid wastes. The
increase in coal mining, for example, is simply the expansion of an existing industry that
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gaily binding, although financial assistance will be conditioned on their
compliance.2 32 The Office of Research and Development is currently
drafting PCGDs for three synthetic fuel processes: Low BTU goal gas-
ification, indirect coal gasification, and oil shale. They are expected to
be ready in the latter part of 1981. EPA's decision to issue PCGDs in
lieu of NSPS for synthetic fuel projects will likely be subject to legal
challenge. Since the correctness of the EPA's position is not free from
doubt, the resulting uncertainty increases regulatory risk for project
sponsors.
Although the EPA will not require the synthetic fuel project to
comply with legally binding NSPS, the project will be subject to the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration requirements (PSD) of the
Clean Air Act.233
The PSDs apply to any major source with the potential to emit 100
or more tons per year of any air pollutant.234 Although the scope of
application of the PSD provisions was significantly reduced from the
EPA's first attempt to adopt final rules, 235 the current requirements236
is already regulated by EPA and the Department of the Interior's Office of Surface Min-
ing. The current increase in production of fuel-grade alcohol also utilizes conventional
manufacturing processes and there is, therefore, a data base on which to formulate con-
ventional emission standards and effluent limitations.
Regulating new, presently non-existent energy industries, of course, presents differ-
ent problems from regulating long-standing segments of United States industry. The
differences are of such an extent that a unique regulatory approach is demanded. The
differences arise primarily from the facts that the new energy industries are, for the most
part, not yet commercialized in the United States, have potentially different effluents and
emissions from those from existing pollution sources and are being developed on a tele-
scoped time frame under a governmentally-mandated response to "the energy crisis."
There is, unfortunately, little or no existing source of commercial-scale, real process
data on which to base a "conventional" regulatory approach at this time. We have, for
example, "borrowed" the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) from the fuel gas
portion of a refinery to apply to the similar portion of a synthetic fuels plant. Because of
these circumstances, the general approach we are taking is to issue, as preregulatory
multi-media guidance, a series of Pollution Control Guidance Documents, (PCGDs)--one
for each of the major energy technologies. The focal point of each PCGD is to be a set
of available control alternatives for each environmental discharge (again, for all media)
along with associated performance expectations and the basis for the alternatives
presented. The intent is to present guidance for plants of typical size and for each signifi-
cantly different feedstock likely to be used.
New Energy Techologies, supra note 210, at 2.
232. Id
233. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858 (1970), as amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-95, § 108, 91 Stat. 685. These requirements will only affect synthetic fuel projects which
result in air quality degradation in the air quality areas in another state. See note 238 infra.
234. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 169(1), 91 Stat. 740 (to be
coddled in 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1)).
235. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See generally Annual
Review ofSignofcant Developments-1979, 13 NAT. REs. LAW. 290-94 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 52,674-
79 (1980).
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would clearly include a commercial size synthetic fuel project as envi-
sioned under the Energy Security Act. Of critical importance in the
determination whether PSD requirements apply is the assessment of
the air quality status of the project site.237 It is only where the project
site is located in a designated clean air area that the PSD requirements
apply 38 If the project site lies in a nonattainment area,239 the nonat-
tainment requirements would apply to project operation.24 In either
case, it is important to remember that, while the focus of concern is
upon project operation, the regulatory requirements insist on a precon-
struction permit.2 4'
236. 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.24, 52.21 (1979), as amended, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,729 (1980). Several chal-
lenges to the revised PSD standards have been brought and are presently pending before the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals. ENVIR. REP. (BNA) October 24, 1980 at 926. Of major importance to
synthetic fuel projects are the issues of: fugitive emissions and fugitive dust in determining appli-
cability and increment consumption; and, the coverage of non-criteria pollutants.
237. "Clean air areas" are those air quality control regions designated under § 107(d)(1)(D)
and (E) of the Clean Air Act as having ambient air quality better than the applicable national
primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, or for which there is insufficient data to make
a determination of the air quality. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7407(d)(l)(D) and (E) (West Supp. 1980).
Under the Clean Air Act and its accompanying regulations, all areas of the country attaining
NAAQS are designated as either class I or class 2 PSD areas. Class 1 areas are permitted a lower
limit of ambient quality degradation, or ambient increment, than class 2 areas. Currently these
increments apply only to total suspended particulates (TSP) and sulphur dioxide pollutants.
238. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1082-85 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In Alabama
Power, the court stated that the EPA could apply PSD requirements where the source affected
"clean air areas" in other states. The EPA announced that it would not apply PSD review to a
pollutant emitted by a source located in an area designated nonattainment for that pollutant, even
where the source would impact a "clean air area" in another state. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,712 (1980). A
map of air quality designation areas in the oil shale region of Colorado and Utah can be found in
OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at 268.
239. A nonattainment area is an air quality control region in which the ambient air quality
fails to meet the applicable NAAQS. Clean Air Act, § 171(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7501(2) (West Supp.
1980).
240. The nonattainment requirements are designed to ensure "reasonable further progress"
toward attaining compliance with the NAAQS in nonattainment areas. Clean Air Act § 173(l), 42
U.S.C.A. § 7501(1) (West Supp. 1980). To meet this goal the source must use "lowest achievable
emission rate" (LAER) technology and demonstrate that all other sources under his control and
within the same state comply with or on schedule to comply with all applicable emission limita-
tions. Id §§ 173(2), (3), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 750(2), (3) (West Supp. 1980). The nonattainment rules
were revised in light of the action taken by the court in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d
1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and can be found at 45 Fed. Reg. 31,307 (1980).
241. Under the Clean Air Act, each SIP must provide for five types ofpreconstruction review
for each new construction project. These include: (1) compliance with national ambient air quali-
ty standards and state air quality standards; (2) compliance with any applicable NSPS; (3) suita-
bility for a nonattainment area; (4) suitability for a nondegradation (PSD) area; and (5) visibility.
The two most controversial programs are the PSD and nonattainment programs. The PSD permit
cannot be issued unless certain requirements are met. Clean Air Act, § 169(3), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7479(3) (West Supp. 1980). See note 237 supra. In Colorado, the PSD permit is issued and
administered by the Air Pollution Control Division, Colorado Department of Health. COLO. REv.
STAT. § 25-7-112(4) (1974). The nonattainment permit is governed by the Clean Air Act,
§§ I 0(a)(2)(I), 172(a)(I), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7410(a)(2)(I), 7502(a)l (West Supp. 1980). See Hecox &
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The synthetic fuel project will place significant demand upon
water resources in the project areas.242 These demands raise permit
issues of two types: water availability through acquisition and water
quality. Water availability is primarily a question of state law.243 Al-
though the federal government has extensive rights to water in the
West,2 " it has not, as yet, attempted to do so in connection with syn-
thetic fuel projects. 45 State law generally extends permit and approval
requirements to the actual acquisition of water rights. 246 These re-
quirements extend to the acquisition and use of surface waters and
groundwater.247 Water quality standards, on the other hand, are sub-
stantially the result of federal incentive.248 The Clean Water Act re-
quires a permit for the discharge of any pollutant into any public
waters.249 This requirement, however, applies only to point source dis-
Desautels supra note 16, at 9-20 to -23. The national ambient air quality standards pose little
problem for oil shale development. See OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at 266. The
short term standards for particulates and hydrocarbons are occasionally exceeded due to natural
background emissions. The EPA has not, however, treated these background emissions as causing
air quality areas to be classified as nonattainment. Air quality problems arising from natural
sources would not preclude oil shale development, providing the facilities complied with emission
and PSD standards. See HISTORY OF OIL SHALE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 178, at 57.
242. All synthetic fuel technologies are water intensive. See U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency Water Requirements/or Steam-Electric Power Generation and Synthetic Fuel Plants in the
Western United States (1977); ENERGY FROM THE WEST II, supra note 210, at 961-84 (discussing
the effect of water requirements upon several river basins in the West.) Estimates of available
water for energy development in the West differ widely. Compare Dewsnup, Assembling Water
Rightsfor a New Use: NeededReforms in the Law, 17 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 613 (1972) and
Kneese & Brown, Water Demands/or Energy Development, 8 NAT. RES. LAW, 309 (1975) (stating
that much of the water in the West, where the synthetic fuel industry would be located, is over-
appropriated), with U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SYN-
THETIC FUELS DEVELOPMENT: EARTH-SCIENCE CONSIDERATIONS 30 (1979) and GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, WATER SUPPLY SHOULD NOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO MEETING ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT GOALS (1980) (for purposes of synthetic fuel development existing water supplies
appear to be adequate). Recently the Colorado Natural Resources Commission held that suffi-
cient Colorado River Basin water would be available to support a proposed coal gasification pro-
ject as well as an oil shale project. See AnnualReview ofSignificant Developments-1979, 12 NAT.
RES. LAW, 301 (1980). See also SynFuels 10 (McGraw-Hill, February 27, 1981) (Utah State
Water Resources Division finds that no major energy project need be delayed due to issue of
water availability).
243. Water rights are issued and administered, subject to some exceptions by the state. See
generally 6 R. CLARKE WATERS AND WATERS RIGHTS ch. 27 (19-).
244. See Fischer, supra note 21, at 1051-54.
245. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8778 (West Supp. 1980). See note 200
supra.
246. See generally 6 R. CLARKE, WATERS AND WATERS RIGHTS § 502 (19 ),
247. Id § 501.
248. 2 R. CLARKE, supra § 55.6-.7.
249. The Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1251-1376 (West Supp. 1980). See Hecox & Desautels, supra note 16, at 9-23 to -27.
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charges.25 ° Underground water quality, although peripherally ad-
dressed in the Clean Water Act,25' was extensively addressed by
Congress in the Safe Drinking Water Act.252 The Act and implement-
ing regulations, however, address actual subsurface emplacement of
fluids through well injection which affects underground water quali-
ty.253 Pollution of underground waters from seepage or runoff or from
non point sources is addressed by specific substantive statutory
schemes.254
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)255
presents significant regulatory constraints on synthetic fuel projects be-
cause they generate wastes which are covered by the Act and its imple-
menting regulations.256 In connection with "solid waste" generated by
the synthetic fuel project 25 7 not only must a disposal site be located,258
but an adequate and safe means of disposal must be developed.2 59
250. See W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.4(a) (1977).
251. Id § 4.3.
252. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 201, 300f-300j (West Supp. 1980).
253. 40 C.F.R. 146.1-.35 (1980). Agency comments concerning the regulations can be found in
45 Fed. Reg. 42,472 (1980).
254. These include the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2796, andby the Quiet Communities Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3079,
3081-84,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-87 (West Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as RCRA], discussed at text
and notes 256-67, infra; The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1233,
1265(f), 1307 (West Supp. 1980) (providing for controls on non point mine wastes which affect
water quality.) Most mining sources of water quality pollution fall under the point source controls
of the Clean Water Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 434.10-.60 (1980) (coal mining), § 436.20-.382 (1980)
(mineral mining and processing.) See Coping with the Regulatory Maze, supra note 16, at 9-24.
255. See note 254 supra.
256. See Rosbe, RCA and Regulation ofHazardous and Non-Hazardous Solid Wastes-Clos-
ing the Circle of Environmental Control, 35 Bus. LAw. 1519 (1980) (discussing the major features
of the Act and implementing regulations); see also Rodgers, Hazardous Waste Regs Increase in
Complexity, Legal Times of Washington, February 9, 1981.
257. The RCRA defines "solid waste" very broadly. Rosbe, supra note 256, at 1521-22.
258. Disposal of spent shale poses significant problems not only because of its pollution poten-
tial, see notes 215-217 supra and accompanying text, but because its sheer size will tax disposal
facilities. See note 208 supra. Use of federal lands for spent shale disposal will require a separate
permit. See note 180,supra. Under the Mineral Leasing Act, lease tracts are limited to 5,120 acres(8mi 2). 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 181, 241(a) (West Supp. 1980). The FLPMA specifically prohibits dispo-
sal of overburden or waste material outside the lease tract. Id at § 1701. Hence, at present all
activities connected with oil shale mineral development must occur on the lease tract. This may
make development of oil shale uneconomical unless off-site disposal is allowed. See James A.
Joseph, Undersecretary, Memorandum to the Secretary, "Decisions on the Oil Shale Secretarial
Issue Document," U.S. Dep't of the Interior, May 27, 1980. Measures to effect changes in the law
to allow off-site disposal have been introduced in the 97th Congress. See Synfuels 9 (McGraw-
Hill, April 3, 1981). The constraints imposed upon oil shale development on federal land due to
the problem of solid waste disposal are addressed in OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at
248-52.
259. This area is receiving extensive analysis. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL
DEVELOPMENT PLAN-OIL SHALE 42-45 (1979). RCRA defines wastes as hazardous or nonhaz-
47
Fischer: The New Synthetic Fuels Program: Boomlet or Bust
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1980
TULSA L4WJOURVAL [Vol. 16:357
Under RCRA, extensive reporting requirements are imposed on gener-
ators of hazardous wastes2 60 and where the waste is transported off-
site. 6 ' If hazardous wastes are stored on-site for more thn 90 days, the
project operators will qualify as a HWMF and must comply with
HWMF and HWMF permit regulations.262 Hazardous wastes are
likely to be a substantial by-product of synthetic fuel projects.263 Syn-
thetic fuels are not, asyet, listed as toxic substances under the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA).2 4  The Environmental Protection
Agency has maintained that it will not waive pre-notification testing26-
of synthetic fuels.2 66 Depending upon the toxicity of synthetic fuels,
the TSCA may result in constraints upon use and marketing of syn-
thetic fuels that may make the fuel uneconomical. 67
If the synthetic fuel project burns fuel as part of its operation at a
rate greater than 100,000,000 BTU/hr.,268 the facility must use coal as
the source of energy unless an exemption is obtained.2 69 A synthetic
fuel project will likely meet the statutory rate; hence, noncoal-based 270
ardous and applies to generators and transporters of hazardous wastes, owners and operators of
hazardous waste management facilities (HWMF), and establishes criteria for nonhazardous waste
facilities. See Rosbe, supra note 256, at 1521. In situ mining wastes are excluded from RCRA
coverage. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,1210 (1980). This exclusion does not, however, apply to materials
removed from the mine by a modified in situ method of mining.
260. Rosbe, supra note 256, at 1528.
261. Id at 1528-29:
The full set of generator requirements applies to a generator who transports to, or treats,
stores or disposes of his waste in an off-site HWMF ....
Unless there is a change in the FLPMA this is not likely to have significant impact because lessees
are prohibited from removing wastes from the leasehold. See note 258 supra.
262. 40 C.F.R. § 262.34(b) (1980). The standards applicable to HWMFs are discussed in
Rosbe, supra note 256, at 1531-35.
263. See Rosbe, supra note 256, at 1521-27 (discussing the generic requirements for classifying
wastes as hazardous or nonhazardous).
264. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (West Supp. 1980). See W. Rodgers, HANDBOOK ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW § 8.10 (1977).
265. Section 5 of TSCA, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2604 (West Supp. 1980), no person may manufacture a
"new chemical substance" or manufacture or process any chemical substance for a "significant
new use" unless a notice of intention is filed with the Administrator of the EPA at least 90 days
before manufacture or processing. A history of EPA's attempt to implement Section 5 can be
found in.Annual Review ofSignocant Developments-1979, 13 NAT. RESOURCE LAW. 100 (1980).
266. Inside D.O.E., October 17, 1980, at 1.
267. Id
268. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8302(10)(c) (West Supp. 1979).
269. Under §§ 201-202 of the Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8311, 8312 (West Supp. 1979),
new electric powerplants and major fuel burning installations are prohibited from using natural
gas or petroleum as a primary energy source.
270. Coal is defined in § 103 of the Fuel Use Act as "anthracite and bituminous coal, lignite
and any fuel derivative thereof." 42 U.S.C.A. § 8302(a)(5) (West Supp. 1979). By a combination
of statutory and regulatory definition, all forms of coal gas fit within the definition of coal for
purposes of the Fuel Use Act. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 8302(a)(3)(B)(ii), (iv) (West Supp. 1980) (exclud-
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synthetic fuel projects will need an exemption to use their own syn-
thetic fuel feedstock.27 '
The transport of the synthetic fuel feedstock will also require a
host of permits and approvals. The Hazardous Materials Transporta-
tion Act 272 regulates the transportation of hazardous materials that
may pose an unreasonable risk to health and safety.273 The Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899274 provides for the Army Corps of Engineers to
approve construction affecting the navigable capacity of the waters of
the United States.27 Therefore, a permit is required to construct facili-
ties designed to divert and store water from navigable streams27 6 or to
facilitate barge traffic to or from the project site.2 77 If the synthetic fuel
is transported by pipeline, pipeline permits are required from the De-
partment of Transportation with respect to design, construction, and
operation standards278 as well as an accident contingency plan.279
4. Other Requirements
The above list of requirements concerning the conception, con-
struction, and operation of a synthetic fuel project is hardly com-
plete.280 The major federal requirements have been noted but
ing low and medium Btu coal gas from the definition of natural gas); 10 C.F.R. § 500.12(a) (1979)
(not excluding high Btu coal gas from the coal and alternate fuel definitions); 10 C.F.R. § 407.3(f)
(1979), (excluding high Btu gas in its definition of natural gas).
271. Exemptions are available under § 211 of the Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8321(b) (West
Supp. 1979) to allow a covered facility to effect a transition to alternate fuel (synthetic fuel). Dur-
ing the transition period the facility may use petroleum or natural gas as the primary source of
fuel. Since synthetic fuel projects will probably be built in stages, with self-sufficiency capacity
not immediately available, the exemption will likely be necessary to provide power during the
initial stages of commercial operation. See note 130 supra.
272. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1976).
273. Id § 1803. The Act does not present a true permit or approval requirement since the
thrust of the Act is toward registration and reporting. Id at §§ 1804, 1705, rather than condition-
ig transport upon securing prior approvals.
274. March 3, 1899, c. 425, 30 Stat. 1121.
275. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1970). Care should be taken to assure that any surface watercour-
se affected by the synthetic fuel project is not a watercourse subject to the navigation power of the
United States. Army Corps of Engineers Regulations define which waters are considered to be
"navigable waters of the United States." 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1979).
276. Id § 403. See Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
277. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). See generally Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 623 (N.D.
Cal. 1975).
278. 49 C.F.R. § 195 (1979), implementing the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979,
49 U.S.C.A. § 2001-2014 (West Supp. 1980).
279. 49 U.S.C.A. § 2202(e) (West Supp. 1980), 49 C.F.R. § 195.402 (1979).
280. Articles delineating common permit and approval requirements for energy projects are
increasing in number. See note 16 supra.
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numerous other requirements remain unmentioned.28' Similarly, state
and local requirements have not, for the most part, been noted. The
synthetic fuel project will be constructed and operated in an environ-
ment of intense regulatory concern which will place significant de-
mands on project sponsors and project lenders.282 Both private and
public participants to the project will be unwilling to commit funds un-
less they are relatively assured that the necessary permits and approvals
can be obtained so that the project can become operational. While
many permits and approvals affect only one phase of the project, the
application for the permit or approval must be completed, agency ac-
tion predicted, and the cost of compliance factored into the cost of the
project to see if it is economically viable.28 3 This raises, however, the
problem of regulatory risk noted earlier. Restated, the problem of reg-
ulatory risk is that a decision to proceed with a project must be made
on the basis of a necessary permit or approval which is not presently
obtained or, if obtained, is subject to revision or modification. If the
permit or approval is not obtained or obtained only at a higher cost
than initially estimated, the initial commitment of financial assistance
to the project may prove to be inadequate to complete the project as
initially envisioned.
C. Critical and Non Critical Permits and Appro vals
1. The Concept of Criticality
Since the decision to commit financial resources must be made in
the face of regulatory risk, some means must be devised to quantify it.
A basic means of quantifying risk is to distinguish between critical and
non critical permits and approvals. Not all permits and approvals pres-
281. Many requirements are the result of internal agency policies that are not always ex-
pressed in administrative regulations. A complete list of agency requirements can only be devel-
oped after extensive communication with the personnel of agencies involved in the decision-
making process and a review of all permit and approval forms and applications.
282. Cf. R. PIERCE, G. ALLISON & P. MARTIN, ECONOMIC REGULATION: ENERGY, TRANS-
PORTATION AND UTILITIES 815 (1980):
Extraction of oil from shale and manufacture of synthetic oil from coal appear to pose
significant financing problems. The regulatory policy issues raised in such circumstances
are among the most important issues of economic policy the United States will confront
in this decade. The resolution of these issues could have implications far broader thanjust the choice of whether to develop a new source of energy.
See also note 328 infra.
283. In addition many permits and approvals, although they may involve substantive concerns
associated with an advanced stage of project operation, require pre-construction completion. See,
e.g., PSD requirements, discussed at notes 234-41 supra and accompanying text.
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ent the same problems to the project. Ordinarily, the acquisition of a
right-of-way will pose little problem,284 while water division permits
will often be crucial to the successful completion of the project.2 85 One
way to look at permit and approval requirements is to discern if there
are reasonable alternatives which can be used if aparticular permit or
approval is not obtained.286 The number of reasonable alternatives
shows whether a particular permit or approval is critical to the syn-
thetic fuel project. The cost of the permit or approval, while important,
is not necessarily determinative.
A second factor in evaluating the criticalness of a particular permit
or approval is the point of time at which the permit or approval is ob-
tained. At the planning stage of the project, while some flexibility in
project design remains, there are likely more alternatives to a particular
permit; consequently, the likelihood that a particular permit or ap-
proval is critical is reduced. Where, however, the project has
progressed to the stage that actual construction or planned operation
precludes certain alternatives, unobtained permits and approvals may
become more critical than they were when alternatives were available.
For example, once the decision is irrevocably made to use above-
ground retorting of oil shale in whole (or in part as a necessary aspect
of in situ means of recovery), the obtaining of a disposal site and neces-
sary disposal permits for spent shale becomes critical. Without a dispo-
sal site, the project cannot function. 87 While the unavailability of a
disposal site may not affect the project if an in situ method of oil shale
retorting were used, once the decision is made to use a process which
results in the accumulation of above-ground spent shale, a means of
disposal for the spent shale becomes critical.
Delays caused by permit and approval requirements may also af-
284. Access permits, as described in notes 172-178 supra and accompanying text are, of course,
important to the successful completion of the project. They do not, however, ordinarily present
significant impediments to project construction. Where they have in the past, see, e.g., Wilderness
Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973) (strictly construing
section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act to preclude construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline), such
constraints have been quickly set aside. See Act of November 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87
Stat. 576, amending Section 28, 30 U.S.C. § 185(d) (1970) to allow the Secretary of the Interior to
grant sufficiently wide rights-of-way to accommodate the construction of the pipeline.
285. See OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5, at 362-363.
286. For example, agency rules which place constraints upon rights-of-way or access rights
necessary to build synthetic fuel projects on public lands are often framed in terms of reasonable-
ness; see, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1014 (1980) (affirming injunction against a prospector who "unreasonably" destroyed surface re-
sources and forest environment).
287. See note 258 supra.
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fect the project's ability to obtain necessary component parts and key
items as contemplated in procurement schedules. Synthetic fuel
projects will likely involve a significant part of available United States
manufacturing capacity for essential items such as valves, pumps, com-
pressors, and pressure vessels. The anticipated supply shortage in items
critial to any large scale synthetic fuel program will likely exacerbate
supply schedules and costs. Any delay at the project end will lead to
increased product costs and may result in the inability to obtain critical
items, thus redoubling the problems created by delay.288
It may not always be possible to obtain all necessary permits and
approvals before the commitment to undertake the project is made.
Nor does a project necessarily have a vested interest in a permit or
approval already obtained.289 Consequently, any project will carry a
significant number of "critical" permits and approvals. The financial
viability of the project will turn on the successful obtaining of those
permits and approvals within anticipated costs; yet, any opinion con-
cerning the satisfaction of this condition can never amount to anything
more than "reasoned speculation." The most serious and potentially
fatal flaw of the Energy Security Act is that it is completely silent on
ways in which reasonable positions can be taken regarding the likeli-
hood that critical permits and approvals will be obtained and will be
obtained expeditiously. It is altogether likely that the hazards and un-
certainties presented by regulatory risk will prove unacceptable to the
private sector unless the SFC, in effect, guarantees all debt investment,
a position that SFC is statutorily prohibited from taking.290
The absence of statutory attention in the Energy Security Act to
288. Oil Shale Technologies, supra note 5, at 187. The Office of Technological Assessment
concluded:
[t]he deployment of a 400,000-bbl/d industry by 1990 would begin to markedly strain the
capacity of U.S. manufacturers to supply heavy equipment to developers. To deploy a I-
million-bbl/d industry by that time would use between 15 and 30 percent of current U.S.
annual production of this equipment. There would be a similar strain on the capacity of
large integrated architectural/engineering firms capable of undertaking major process
plant construction.
Id at 181. A Bill introduced in the 97th Congress would only exacerbate the problem of strained
equipment supplies. H.R. REP. No. 1032, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to amend the Energy Se-
curity Act to restrict use of foreign produced articles, materials, and supplies in the construction of
synthetic fuel projected financially assisted by the SFC).
The OTA assessment should be contrasted with the production goals established by the En-
ergy Security Act: "Production of at least 500,000 barrels of crude oil per day of synthetic fuel by
1987 and of at least 2,000,000 barrels of crude oil per day of synthetic fuel by 1992." Energy
Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8701(a)(2) (West Supp. 1980).
289. See note 122 supra.
290. See notes 35-42 and 56-58 supra and accompanying text.
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the problem of regulatory risk exists due to the fact that the Energy
Security Act was designed to work in conjunction with the Energy Mo-
bilization Board proposal. The projects financed by the SFC were in-
tended to be included within the regulatory "fast track" permit and
approval procedures to be administered by the Energy Mobilization
Board.29' The demise of the Energy Mobilization Board proposal cre-
ated a regulatory problem that Congress did not anticipate. Given the
close relationship between project financing and regulatory risk, it is a
problem that may prove overwhelming to project sponsors unless the
project can obtain critical permits and approvals before loan commit-
ments are made.292
2. The DOE "Fast Start" Solicitations
The DOE "fast start" solicitations under the two interim pro-
grams293 may provide some guidance as to how the SFC and the pri-
vate sector will handle the problem of regulatory risk. The synthetic
fuel program is largely one of unknown dimensions. Neither the pri-
vate sector nor the federal government has had any prior experience
regarding what works and what does not in this area. It should not be
unexpected that SFC implementation of its program will follow ap-
proaches developed and used by DOE during the interim program.2 94
Under both interim programs, the DOE has recognized that it is
impossible to condition financial assistance on the prior obtaining of all
necessary permits and approvals.295 One the other hand, the "proposed
terms and conditions" for financial assistance specifically require that
"[t]he Recipient shall procure all necessary permits or licenses and
abide by all applicable laws, regulations and ordinances of the United
States and of the state, territory, and political subdivisions. '296 Recon-
ciling these two points will be significant to the success of financial
commitments made to assist the development of a synthetic fuel indus-
291. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8775(i) (West Supp. 1980).
292. This is already occurring in the wake of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Office of Consumers' Counsel which disallowed certain essential tariffs approved by
FERC. See note 13 supra and accompanying text and notes 63-66, supra, for a discussion of Office
of Consumers' Counsel.
293. See notes 91-111 supra and accompanying text.
294. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
295. This is implicit in the permit scheduling requirements imposed by both solicitations. See
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, Program Solicitation for Proposals under Nonnuclear Act, supra note 100
at 111-12 and U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, Program Solicitation for Proposalsfor FinancialAassistance
of Title I, supra note 109, at 111-13 [hereinafter collectively cited as Program Solicitations].
296. Id at 11-5, incorporating provision B-Il.
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try. The tenor of the solicitations shows that DOE has taken an ap-
proach focusing primarily on identification and scheduling as the
means of assessing the effect of regulatory risk upon the adequacy of
project financing.
a. Ident~fcation
The DOE solicitations require a project applicant to "[i]dentify all
permits required for project initiation, construction and operation, and
identify those permits not yet obtained ... "I"
Proper identification of regulatory requirements begins with a
thorough assessment of the character of the project. Factors which
must be considered include, among others: (1) the design of the project
in terms of output; (2) the site including location and characteristics; (3)
feedstock sources and requirements; (4) other materials requirements;
(5) feed-stock, materials and product transportation; (6) effects upon
water quality and availability; and, (7) disposal and containment of
waste products. 298
After the project has been thoroughly examined, it must then be
equated with relevant regulatory requirements. The DOE solicitations
provide little guidance beyond identifying several major federal pro-
grams which will have application, without question, to any synthetic
fuel project.2 99 In effect, DOE has simply recast, without explanation
or quantification, various concerns expressed in several studies examin-
ing the potential consequences arising out of the development of a do-
mestic synthetic fuel industry.3° No attempt has been made to identify
the relative importance of any one of the necessary permits or approv-
als,30 1 except for a general admonition to "[i]dentify 'critical' path per-
mits or other requirements and describe potential problem areas which
297. Id at 111-7.
298. Id at 111-8 to 111-12.
299. Id at 111-12.
300. See POLICY ANALYSIS REPORT, sUpra note 167; Environmental Development Plansfor En-
ergy Technology Programs, Summary Report, 5-1 to 5-17 (DOE/EDP-0062).
301. Program Solicitations, supra note 295, at IV-2:
B. Relative Importance ofEvaluation Criteria
I. No single evaluation criterion is so predominantly important as to overshadow
other criteria. Rather, a balance is sought among all the criteria which will best
meet the purpose of selecting projects which propose a viable technical process, and
a well thought out, commercially viable project, which will become commercially
competitive. The accuracy of the project cost estimate is important in that it largely
dictates the commercial viability of the project, and the requirement for Govern-
ment financial assistance. While the financial assistance being sought is a relatively
flexible element of the proposal, the Government will seek to maximize the effect of
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could prevent or delay the receipt of such permits."3 °2 No definition of
"critical path permits" is provided in either solicitation.
The DOE solicitations do envision that conditional commitments
may be awarded.3"3 The conditional commitment will, however, be of
little assistance if future conditional commitments follow the approach
taken in the Great Plains Coal Gasification Project. In that project,
DOE conditionally committed $250 million to assist in first year con-
struction costs of a coal gasification project to be built in North Da-
kota.3°4 The conditional commitment provided:
Licenses andpermits. The following conditions are relative to
the obtaining of licenses, permits, certificates, and state/local
clearances.
4.1 The borrower agrees to comply with all applicable Fed-
eral, State and local environmental, land use, water,
health, safety, antitrust laws and applicable Federal reg-
ulations.
4.2 Prior to any disbursement under the loan, the borrower
has available to it all critical Federal, State and local
permits, licenses and certificates in order to undertake
construction and operation of the proposed project and
DOE is satisfied that all other permits, licenses and cer-
tificates will be acquired in an appropriate and timely
manner.
4.3 The adverse community and worker impacts resulting
from the proposed demonstration facility have been ade-
quately evaluated by the borrower, in the opinion of
DOE, and all steps necessary to mitigate such adverse
impacts have or will be taken to DOE's satisfac-
tion. . 305
Again, as with the solicitation itself, no attempt was made in the
conditional commitment to specify what is or is not a "critical per-
the authorities available to it to best promote commercial production capacity at the
least possible risk to the Government.
2. No formal weights are being assigned to the criteria, nor to the subcriteria. This
does not preclude the use by evaluators of numerical scoring schemes as an aid to
reaching their conclusions.
302. Program Solicitations, supra note 295, at 111-13.
303. Id at II-5.
304. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,719 (1980).
305. Conditional Commitment to Guarantee "A High Btu Coal Gasification Plant to be Con-
structed in Mercer County, North Dakota" (July 18, 1980) (agreement between DOE and Great
Plains Gasification Associates) (copy on file with this author).
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mit.' '3 6 The DOE was apparently prepared to treat the issue of "criti-
calness" as too fluid to subject to general definition. In effect, the
determination of "criticalness" is left to negotiation between the par-
ties. Consequently, an exact definition of "criticalness" will be signifi-
cantly influenced by the parties' experience and knowledge of the
specific regulatory processes involved in obtaining necessary permits
and approvals relative to the specific project at hand.
b. Scheduling
The inability to define and predict what is or is not a "critical"
permit, places tremendous importance on scheduling as a means of
providing a check to assure that regulatory risk and financial viability
remain in an acceptable equilibrium.
The interim solicitations require the project applicant to provide a
permit and approval timetable which shows: (1) the data acquisition
phase; (2) the date formal application for the permit or license must be
made; (3) whether the granting agency must hold public hearings; and,
(4) the anticipated date of the receipt of necessary permits and
licenses.0 7 The project applicant is also required to show the relation-
ship between the permit schedule and the overall project schedule. 30 8
While the applicant is not required to have all permits and licenses in
place as a condition to the award of financial assistance under the DOE
"fast start" programs, the applicant is required to identify (prior to
obtaining financial assistance) all permits and approvals that will be
required in conjunction with the construction and operation of the syn-
thetic fuel project.30 9
The solicitations' requirement of permit and approval identifica-
tion and scheduling, constitutes the sum and substance of regulatory
guidance regarding the interrelationship between the permit process
and the financial viability of the project. The solicitations allow the
project sponsors to make the necessary assumptions about which per-
mits and approvals will prove to be "critical," and whether any signifi-
306. There is, however, a significant difference between the solicitations and the conditional
commitment, in that the former do not require the obtaining of a "critical" permit before disburse-
ment, whereas the latter does. Id at § 4.2. It seems evident that, depending upon what permits
have and have not been obtained at the time of disbursement, the DOE is prepared to schedule
partial disbursements, with the disbursement schedule tied to permit acquisition.
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cant problems are associated with the obtaining of any project permit
or approval. 10 Of course, the officials at DOE have some familiarity
with the nuances of the regulatory process. It can therefore be antici-
pated that the quality and perceptiveness of the permit schedule and
criticalness assumptions made by the project sponsors31' will be highly
indicative of the sophistication and competence of the project sponsors
with respect to the likelihood that they will secure the necessary regula-
tory clearances to complete the project. This in turn will no doubt in-
fluence DOE officials in determining which projects to extend
assistance to under the "fast start" program.
3. The SFC Initial Solicitation
On Friday, October 31, 1980, the SFC published its "initial solici-
tation for project proposals. ' 312 The draft solicitation was exceedingly
sketchy, contrasting sharply with the lengthy solicitations used by DOE
under the interim "fast start" programs. 3  The SFC decided not to
require proposals to meet detailed specifications, 3 4 deferring such re-
quirements until a later phase of the solicitation process. Nevertheless,
it is difficult to envision how a project applicant could respond to the
SFC solicitation without substantially duplicating most of the require-
ments of the interim "fast start" solicitations. It is equally unclear how
the SFC could make a reasonable decision about which proposals jus-
tify further study without most of the information required by the in-
terim program.315 The SFC initial solicitation does not free the project
applicant from providing most of the information which would have
been required if the project were seeking financial assistance under the
"fast start" program. It probably does allow greater flexibility of or-
ganization and structure of the proposal than was possible under the
DOE-administered programs. Since this flexibility may result in a de-
lay in the actual dissemination by the SFC of its project requirements,
the desire to be flexible may prove counterproductive.
310. Id at 111-8.
311. This is required of project sponsors. See note 302 supra and accompanying text.
312. 45 Fed. Reg. 72,374 (1980).
313. The two Interim Program Solicitations each exceeded 100 pages. The SFC solicitation
was two pages long.
314. 45 Fed. Reg. 72,375 (1980).
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IV. EXPEDITING AND HARMONIZING THE REGULATORY PROCESS
There is little dispute that government regulation of energy
projects is chaotic and disorganized. While the disorder has been diag-
nosed, there is significant disagreement over the proper method of
treatment. One suggested remedy anticipates the creation of a super
agency with authority to impose order by mandating decision-making
schedules and timetables with which regulatory agencies, at all levels of
government, would be required to comply.316 This view was expressed
in the proposal, now apparently defunct, to create an Energy Mobiliza-
tion Board.317 The attempt to create a super agency was criticized re-
cently by this author.318 While it was acknowledged that there is a
need to expedite the decision-making process, attempts to coerce com-
pliance are arguably unconstitutional within the framework proposed
for the Energy Mobilization Board and probably ineffective even if the
proposal were constitutional. Project decision expediting would be bet-
ter accomplished within a framework of mutual assent.319 The Energy
Security Act favors the restrained latter view in its requirement that
projects located in states which indicate an intention to expedite all reg-
ulatory, licensing, and government agency activities related to synthetic
fuel projects shall be afforded a priority in the awarding of financial
assistance. 320 While this view may be, for the reasons expressed in this
article, a practical necessity, it is encouraging that Congress under-
316. See Report by the Comptroller General, The Review Processfor Priority Energy Projects
Should be Expedited (EMD-80-6, 1979). The Report listed several desirable characteristics that
an Expediting Program should have, id, at 43-45, including the following recommendation:
7. The Board should have adequate authority to insure that schedules of energyprojects of
critical national importance are met.
We believe that limiting the Board's power to establishing a permit schedule would be
insufficient because the Board could not insure that the schedule would be met. At the
same time, the program should provide necessary features and safeguards to avoid
abuses of power and to preserve the integrity of the permit process itself, allowing effec-
tive airing of concerns on sensitive issues.
Id at 45 (emphasis added).
317. See S. 1308, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (as amended and reported out of conference).
See H.R. Rep. 1119, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The Conference Report was rejected by the
House. It is likely that attempts will be made to resurrect the proposal. See [1980] EN. USERS
REP. (BNA) No. 360 at 1, 3 and [1980] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) No. 376 at 1, 8. During the
campaign, President Reagan publically announced his opposition to the proposal. The effect this
will have is uncertain.
318. Fischer, supra note 21.
319. Id at 1080-85.
320. Energy Security Act, supra note 15, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8723(0 (West Supp. 1980). This same
requirement was inserted in the Interim "fast start" Programs administered by DOE. See Pro-
gram Solicitations, supra note 295, at IV-5.
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stands the legitimate concerns of the states and their citizens in being
able to exercise some control over their local environment and lifestyle.
Regulatory agencies and regulators are already trying to impose
some order in the decision-making process attendant with building en-
ergy projects.321 Colorado has approached the problem of regulatory
risk by attempting to bring together regulators, project sponsors, and
interested parties; having these groups set forth and describe their
needs and concerns, and voluntarily agree to coordinate their decision-
making processes and self-implement the program.322 There is, unfor-
tunately, a scarcity of information about the success or failure of the
Colorado program. As with the consolidated permit proposals cur-
rently being implemented by the EPA, there seems to be some reluc-
tance on the part of the private sector to embrace the Colorado
program. Whether this is the result of substantive concerns regarding
321. These efforts include consolidated permit programs, wherein an agency seeks to adminis-
ter several different but related programs through a single application and decisionmaking pro-
cess; cooperative agreements, wherein state and federal agencies attempt to define respective
duties and areas of concern; and state siting laws, which attempt to consolidate permit and ap-
proval requirements within a single statutory scheme. See Fischer, supra note 21, at 1080-85.
Also fitting within this category are the final regulations promulgated in 1978 by the Council
of Environmental Quality. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1978), providing for a "scoping" procedure
whereby the designated lead agency assigned to prepare the EIS would invite affected governmen-
tal agencies and interested members of the public to participate in the preparation of the EIS. See
Comments, New Rules for the NEPA Process: CEQ Establishes Uniform Procedures to Improve
Implementation, 9 ENVIR. L. REP. 10005 (1979).
322. The Program is known as the Colorado Joint Review Process. It is administered by the
Colorado Department of Natural Resources. It is self described as follows:
Colorado's Joint Review Process for Major Energy and Mineral Resource Development
Projects (JRP) is an intergovernmental review process that coordinates government's review of
major energy and mineral resource development projects ...
The JRP is a management system designed to coordinate regulatory and administrative re-
views conducted by the three levels of government, thus expediting those review processes and
improving the quality of project planning and review. It provides the public and industry with
increased opportunity to become involved with government in the review of a project. Participa-
tion in the JRP is voluntary; its success depends on a high level of communication, cooperation,
and compromise. The JRP is not a new regulatory program and does not establish new regulatory
bureaucracy. It is not an attempt to create an energy facility siting procedure or other new deci-
sion-making authority.
This manual provides a suggested comprehensive set of coordination procedures that should
be used when conducting joint reviews of "major" energy or mineral resource development (i.e.,
the end of exploration or the beginning of design/feasibility). Although specific step-by-step coor-
dination procedures are provided, nothing in this manual should be considered mandatory or
rigid. On the contrary, the manual is a flexible guideline which can and should be modified or
scaled-down to accommodate the unique characteristics of projects undergoing joint review. Col-
orado's Joint Review Process for Major Energy and Mineral Resource Development Projects 1
(December, 1980).
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the efficacy of the program or an unwillingness to be the first to partici-
pate in a new, untried process cannot be determined.323
Whatever the eventual determination of the merits velnon of these
programs, the awarding of financial assistance will probably be influ-
enced by their mere existence because of section 127(f)(1). 324 Con-
sequently, project sponsors must be prepared to deal with agency
programs which seek to harmonize regulatory processes.325
V. CONCLUSION
The construction of large scale energy projects, such as those envi-
sioned by the Energy Security Act, entails the commitment of signifi-
cant financial resources. Delays encountered in completing such
projects, whether the result of built-in regulatory schedules, such as the
requirement of one year's monitoring for a PSD permit326 or the result
of regulatory duplication, overlap and complexity, increase project
cost. Where the time necessary to complete regulatory decisionmaking
can be quantified, a decision can be made whether the project is cur-
rently financially viable, giving due weight to current financial condi-
tions and uncertainties. Where, however, the time for agency
decisionmaking cannot be quantified, a new uncertainty is added
which, in a domino fashion, affects all other financial assumptions. A
project which costs X amount of dollars if built today and completed in
four years, costs Xplus dollars if construction is delayed because cer-
tain agency permits or approvals are not in hand.327 Consequently, a
financial commitment based upon a project cost of X dollars may be
lost or prove to be inadequate if the project now costs Xplus dollars.
The federal government has attempted to quantify the prospect of reg-
ulatory risk through identification and scheduling of regulatory re-
quirements. Whether this quantification will be adequate depends
323. This may be changing. Recently, it was reported that a fourth major project has sought
to be brought under the Joint Review Program. See SynFuels 10, McGraw-Hill, January 23, 1981
(W.R. Grace and Co.'s proposed coal-to-methanol project in Northwestern Colorado reported to
have joined Colorado's Joint Review Process.)
324. See note 320 supra and accompanying text.
325. Some of these programs are voluntary, such as the Colorado Program; others, such as
requirements imposed by state siting laws or cooperative agreements are not.
326. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a), (b) (e)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
327. See notes 53 and 116 supra.
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upon the perceptiveness of the parties making and evaluating the accu-
racy and completeness of the identification and the soundness of the
schedule. It is a $20 billion gamble in human abilities to prophecize.328
328. [L]oan guarantees have consequences for both Government decisionmaking and the
private sector. Such guarantees may result in Federal outlays although neither the tim-
ing nor the magnitude of those outlays can be forecast. . . . Consequences for the pri-
vate sector may include increasing the probability of default and of premature
shutdowns and higher interest rates for borrowers who do not benefit from the guaran-
tees.
Senate Comm. on the Budget, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., FederalEnergy Financing: Financialand Budg-
etary Implications of Government Guarantees IX (Comm. Print August 30, 1976).
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